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THE NEW DETERRENCE:
CRIME AND POLICY IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION
Patrick J. Keenan*
Crime has historically been a local phenomenon.  Most murder victims 
know their killers;1 most victims of child abuse know their abusers;2 victims 
of theft often need not look beyond their own neighborhoods for the thieves.  
Crime is regulated locally.  In the United States, it is the states, not the 
federal government, that prosecute the vast majority of criminal cases.3  Law 
enforcement budgets may rely on funds from the federal government, but 
enforcement priorities are set locally.  And although there is some 
coordination among law enforcement agencies from different states in the 
U.S. and between agencies from different countries, crime remains a local 
problem.
Globalization is changing this in ways that have yet to be fully explored.  
Although crime as an event will always have a substantial local component 
because it is typically responded to by officials and victims in the place it 
occurs, it is becoming much more of a transnational phenomenon.  It is 
increasingly common for activity that is regulated in one country because it 
is dangerous or unwanted to become more common in other countries where 
the activity is equally (or almost equally) unwanted but much less 
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1The victim and offender know each other in approximately 76% of 
homicide cases.  SHANNAN M. CATALANO, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2003 
1 (Bureau of Justice Statistics National Crime Victim Survey 2004).
2LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, CHILD VICTIMIZERS:  VIOLENT 
OFFENDERS AND THEIR Victims 10 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1996) 
(reporting that 85.9% of child victims knew their victimizer).  
3AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL 
LAW (1998) (reporting that only 4% of all crimes in the United States are 
prosecuted in federal court).  
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effectively regulated.  What happens when activity that is unwanted in two 
places is more effectively regulated in one place than in the other?  Does the 
unwanted activity migrate from the first state to the second?  How much of 
it migrates, and what factors influence the amount of displacement?  How 
should we conceive of regulation in these circumstances--as a local response 
to a local problem or as part of a broader effort to reduce the overall 
incidence of the unwanted activity?  These questions are fundamental to 
determining what globalization will mean in the new century, but so far 
have not been fully explored.  The existing scholarship on deterrence will be 
of limited use in a globalized context.  
This article is the first attempt to fill the gap by developing a richer 
approach to deterrence for a globalized world.  I draw insights from both 
law-and-economics and criminology literature to enrich our understanding 
of deterrence.  To ground my theoretical discussion in a real-world problem, 
throughout the article I use sex tourism as an example of the kind of 
unwanted activity that now crosses borders and has complicated our 
understanding of deterrence.  I focus on two issues central to deterrence in a 
globalized world that have not gotten sufficient scholarly attention:  the 
phenomenon of displacement and the role of status.  I add three important 
considerations.  First, I argue that informal sanctions, as opposed to formal, 
legal sanctions, are increasingly important and must be part of any effective 
deterrence policy.  Second, I argue that substitution—when activity migrates 
from one location to another because of changes in enforcement policy in 
the first place—is a complicated process that can be manipulated to enhance 
deterrence.  Finally, I argue that when unwanted behavior involves people 
from different countries, we must consider the role of status in deterrence.  
Differences in status can distort the social processes of judgment and 
disapproval that allow communities to control unwanted behavior without 
recourse to law.  These are vitally important issues.  Because globalized 
crime is so widely dispersed, it will be almost impossible for the local 
communities affected to get together and develop a coordinated plan.  If we 
are to prevent law enforcement successes in the West from turning into 
social disasters for those in the developing world, we must bring theory into 
step with the ways that globalization has changed the reality of crime.  
This Article proceeds in five parts.  In Part I, I begin with an illustration 
of the kind of phenomenon that drives my analysis:  sex tourism, the 
practice of tourists traveling abroad to engage in sex with prostitutes, often 
children.  Any discussion of deterring unwanted activity on a global scale 
could have significance in the spheres of terrorism, white collar crime, 
money laundering, environmental activity, and commercial regulation.  But 
I use the example of sex tourism because it contains stark examples of the 
kinds of legal and social issues at the heart of deterrence.  In this part, I 
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describe the ways that the tools of globalization have allowed sex tourism to 
grow and thrive. 
In Part II, I lay out and critique the literature that frames the current 
discourse on crime and its deterrence.  The literature fits into two broad 
categories:  economics and sociology (or criminology).  The law-and-
economics literature assumes that people deciding whether to engage in 
activity that is unwanted by the larger society behave rationally.  That is, 
potential offenders weigh the utility they will receive from the activity 
against two factors:  the probability of being caught engaging in the activity 
and the sanction they would suffer if caught.  The law-and-economics 
approach is general; it simplifies complex phenomena so they can be 
modeled and examined.  But simplification can render the results of the 
model of only marginal use in a world populated by individual people, each 
motivated by her own reasons and emotions.  At the other extreme is the 
work of criminologists and sociologists.  This literature often considers the 
motivations of individual offenders in an attempt to understand the amalgam 
of reasons that people commit crimes (or, for that matter, engage in any 
activity, criminal or not).4  This literature is often too specific to be of use in 
shaping policy.
Parts III and IV are the heart of the article.  Part III contains the first of 
my refinements of the traditional view of deterrence.  The most basic model 
draws on a straightforward law-and-economics framework and considers 
three variables:  the utility that the desired illegal behavior will bring to the 
offender, the probability that he will be detected, and the expected legal 
sanction.  This rational choice framework underlies most discussions of 
deterrence.  More sophisticated law-and-economics models attempt to 
account for the possibility that an increase in the cost of one crime (either 
through a harsher punishment or stricter enforcement) will lead the offender 
to substitute another activity for the preferred crime.5  These models 
4Dan Kahan, among a handful of others, has attempted to chart a 
“third way” that “combines the virtues of both economics and sociology 
without succumbing to the vices of either.”  Dan M. Kahan, Between 
Economics and Sociology:  The New Path of Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REV.
2477 (1997).  Kahan’s work has highlighted many of the issues important to 
a richer understanding of deterrence, but does not (and does not purport to) 
address the complex issues that arise when unwanted activity crosses 
borders. 
5Underlying my argument are two broad assumptions that I must 
acknowledge at the outset.  First, I assume that, in most cases, the regulation 
of unwanted activity is more effective in the West than in the developing 
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compare two deterrence equations to ask if the benefit from new activity, 
reduced by the costs mentioned above, is greater than the benefit from the 
original activity (also reduced by the two costs).  I argue that these models, 
in their attempt at simplicity, leave out an important factor.  In most models, 
substitution is assumed to be a costless transaction.  This assumption--
dubious even with regard to domestic crime--is at odds with the reality of 
transnational activity.  There are substantial risks associated with 
displacement or substitution,6 including the costs of switching from one 
activity to another, gathering information on the second activity, and the 
cost of violating norms against the new activity.  When these factors are 
included in the equation, what seem to be adequate policy responses begin 
to look inadequate.  
Part IV addresses the complicated role that status plays in deterrence.  
Most considerations of deterrence spend no time considering the effect of 
status differences in deterring transnational crimes.7  Status is important to 
deterrence in a variety of ways.  My discussion centers on its role in the 
creation, enforcement, and erosion of social norms, the social rules and 
customs that guide and govern the behavior of most people.  In Part V I 
briefly conclude by attempting to apply the lessons of theory to policy 
options.
Before moving on, three clarifications are in order.  “Globalization” is a 
slippery term that is used to explain any number of ills and benefits.  I use a 
world.  Because of this, globalization combined with the difference in the 
effectiveness of regulation between the West and the developing world can 
have the effect of displacing illegal, unwanted, or anti-social activity from 
the West to other parts of the world.  In other words, effective regulation in 
the West can lead to the export of social or commercial problems from the 
West to the developing world.  Such displacement can carry serious 
consequences for both the West and the developing world.  Second, I argue 
that regulations that target unwanted activity can and should account for the 
potential for displacement.  To be considered effective, regulations must 
reduce the incidence of the problem they seek to regulate, not merely 
transfer it elsewhere.
6I use the terms "substitution" and "displacement" interchangeably.  
For my purposes, both describe the same phenomenon; substitution is the 
term preferred by economics, while criminologists typically use 
displacement.
7Criminologists study status when considering the relationship 
between victims and perpetrators, for example, but my consideration of 
status focuses on its role in deterrence.
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definition adopted from Joseph Stiglitz, formerly chief economist at the 
World Bank and the head of President Bill Clinton's council of economic 
advisors.  As I use it, globalization means the closer integration of the 
countries and peoples of the world due to a radical reduction in the 
transaction costs associated with transnational activity.  This is due mostly 
to a reduction in costs of transportation and communication.8  It means that 
transnational activity happens more quickly, more easily, and more often 
than in the past.  In other words, it is now possible for vast numbers of 
people to do very often what small numbers of people used to do only 
occasionally.  Two types of activity fit into my definition of "unwanted 
activity."  Unwanted activity either violates the law or violates norms or 
customs, regardless of whether it is legal or illegal.  I define unwanted 
activity in this way to account for both illegal and socially-unacceptable but 
legal activities.  By "regulation," I mean actions that aim to reduce the 
incidence of behavior.  This can take the form of criminal prohibitions, 
which have as their goal the elimination of an activity.  It can take the form 
of administrative rules or other statutes that seek to set the conditions under 
which an activity may be undertaken.  It can also take the form of the 
intentional creation or support of helpful norms that reduce the incidence of 
unwanted activity by encouraging people to choose not to engage in the 
activity.  By using this broad definition, I wish to encompass any attempt to 
restrain, limit, or regularize activity that is in any way unwanted.  
I.  THE NEW MOBILITY OF UNWANTED ACTIVITY:  THE EXAMPLE OF SEX 
TOURISM
Sex tourism happens when tourists from North America, Western and 
Northern Europe, Japan, and Australia travel to the developing world to 
have sex with prostitutes, often including child prostitutes.  It has exploded 
in recent years.9  Sex tourism, and the illicit sexual activity that is at its 
heart, has many elements, as do the many forms of regulation that exist to 
suppress it.  On the supply side of the equation are prostitutes, including 
8Stiglitz writes that globalization is "the closer integration of 
countries and peoples of the world which has been brought about by the 
enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, the 
breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, 
knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across borders."  JOSEPH E. 
STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 9 (2002).  
9See, e.g., Sex Tour Travel Agencies Targeted, USA TODAY, Feb. 13, 
2004.
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children,10 and those who facilitate their exploitation, like brothel owners 
and sex tour organizers and operators.  On the demand side are tourists who 
patronize prostitutes.  The industry thrives because suppliers and tourists can 
exploit the tools of globalization to find each other.  Brothel owners take 
advantage of porous borders and the easy flow of capital to find, buy, and 
transport prostitutes.11  They also rely on the inequalities brought to light by 
globalization for a steady supply of recruits, either misled into the industry 
or sold by their families.  Tourists use the Internet to gather information 
about sex tourist destinations,including strategies on ways to avoid 
detection, and they rely on easier travel to get to the prostitutes.  The 
purpose of examining sex tourism is to better understand the problem of 
globalized crime and to provide a real-world example to ground the 
theoretical discussion.
A.  Illicit Sexual Behavior and Globalization
Although it is little known in the U.S., the problem of sex tourism has 
begun to attract significant attention internationally.  In recent years there 
has been a spate of reports on the increase in sex tourism.12  Accurate 
10See Heather Montgomery, Child Sex Tourism in Thailand, in 
TOURISM IN THE LESS DEVELOPED WORLD:  ISSUES AND CASE STUDIES 191-
201 (David Harrison, ed., 2001); see generally CHRIS RYAN & C. MICHAEL 
HALL, SEX TOURISM:  MARGINAL PEOPLE AND LIMINALITIES (2001).
11See JOANE NAGEL, RACE, ETHNICITY, AND SEXUALITY:  INTIMATE 
INTERSECTIONS, FORBIDDEN FRONTIERS 212-216 (2003); see generally 
RYAN BISHOP & LILLIAN S. ROBINSON, NIGHT MARKET:  SEXUAL CULTURES 
AND THE THAI ECONOMIC MIRACLE (1998); SIETSKE ALTINK, STOLEN LIVES:  
TRADING WOMEN INTO SEX AND SLAVERY (1995).
12See, e.g., UNICEF, STUDY ON THE SEXUAL ABUSE AND 
EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN IN THE GAMBIA (2003); CASA ALIANZA, 
REGIONAL INVESTIGATION ON TRAFFICKING, PROSTITUTION, CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY AND SEX TOURISM WITH CHILDREN IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
AND MEXICO (2001); ELENA AZAOLA, UNICEF-DEF, BOY AND GIRL 
VICTIMS OF SEXUAL EXPLOITATION IN MEXICO (2000); UNICEF, CHILDREN 
ON THE EDGE:  PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND 
TRAFFICKING IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC [hereinafter CHILDREN ON THE 
EDGE]; JUDITH O'CONNELL DAVIDSON & JACQUELINE SANCHEZ TAYLOR, 
ECPAT, CHILD PROSTITUTION AND SEX TOURISM:  COSTA RICA (1995); 
JUDITH O'CONNELL DAVIDSON & JACQUELINE SANCHEZ TAYLOR, ECPAT, 
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numbers are hard to come by, but the United Nations estimates that there are 
at least 2 million child prostitutes worldwide.13  The most common 
destination countries are in Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America.  
UNICEF estimates that there are 400,000 child prostitutes in Thailand,14 and 
that half of those involved in prostitution are trafficked; that is, they are sold 
or traded to brothel owners.  Reports by non-governmental organizations put 
the number of adult female prostitutes at 300,000 and children at 75,000 in 
the Philippines and between 10,000 and 15,000 in Cambodia.15  The 
CHILD PROSTITUTION AND SEX TOURISM:  THAILAND (1994); HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, A MODERN FORM OF SLAVERY:  TRAFFICKING OF BURMESE 
WOMEN AND GIRLS INTO BROTHELS IN THAILAND (1993) [hereinafter A 
MODERN FORM OF SLAVERY].
13 CNN, “Sex Tourism” Rapist Jailed in France (Oct. 20, 2000), 
available at
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/france/10/20/france.trial/ 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
14Id.  In my discussion of sex tourism, I group together those who 
patronize child prostitutes and those who patronize adult prostitutes.  Even 
though these activities are normatively distinct, I consider them together for 
several reasons.  First, both kinds of prostitution are part of the same market; 
they rely on the same supply chain for prostitutes (often human trafficking), 
and they advertise to the same pool of potential customers.  See, e.g., A 
MODERN FORM OF SLAVERY, supra note 12; FRANCIS T. MIKO & GRACE 
JEA-HYUN PARK, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, TRAFFICKING IN 
WOMEN AND CHILDREN:  THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE (2002).  
Second, it is often not possible to make clean age distinctions.  For example, 
consider a country in which the age of majority is 15, meaning that a 
prostitute who would be considered a child in the U.S. is considered an 
adult.  When a customer patronizes a 15-year-old prostitute, it is unclear 
whether he is engaging in “child sex tourism” or just “sex tourism.”  See 
generally RYAN & HALL, supra note 10, at 22-46.  Finally, some who 
patronize prostitutes in the developing world do so because they want to 
engage in illicit sexual activity with someone who appears to be a child or 
adolescent, even if she really is not.  For all of these reasons, it is more 
helpful to treat child and adult prostitutes together than to separate them.
15COALITION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN, Facts and Statistics:  
Trafficking and Prostitution in Asia and the Pacific, at www.catw-
ap.org/facts.htm.
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problem is not limited to Asia.  In San Jose, the capital of Costa Rica, there 
are an estimated 2000 girl child prostitutes.16  According to estimates by the 
Organization of American States, there are 2000 child prostitutes in 
Guatemala City; 25,000 in the Dominican Republic; and as many as 500,000 
in Brazil.17  Cuba receives as many as 200,000 male sex tourists every 
year.18  Children become prostitutes through a variety of  means.  Some are 
sold or traded away by relatives.19  Some are promised legitimate jobs in the 
city and willingly accompany procurers, only to be sold or traded to brothel 
owners.20  Some run away from home and enter the trade to feed 
themselves.21
B.  The Logistics of the Industry
The demand side of the business is equally complex and also depends on 
globalization.  Sex tourists rely on technology to exchange information 
about the best places to exploit children and avoid detection by law 
enforcement, use global transportation to travel to destination countries, and 
exploit income inequalities and market pressures that have forced so many 
children into prostitution.  It starts with travelers, usually but not always 
men,22 who sexually exploit local people, often including children.  Like 
16ALISON PHINNEY, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, 
TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN AND CHILDREN FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION IN THE 
AMERICAS, available at www.oas.org/cim/english/proj.traf.alisonpaper.htm.
17Id.
18Michael Clancy, The Globalization of Sex Tourism and Cuba:  A 
Commodity Chains Approach, 36 STUD. COMP. INT’L DEVELOPMENT 63 
(2002).  
19See, e.g., CHILDREN ON THE EDGE, supra note 12, at 5-6.
20See, e.g., UNICEF, BROKEN PROMISES SHATTERED DREAMS:  A 
PROFILE OF CHILD TRAFFICKING IN THE LAO PDR 22 (2004).
21See e.g., A MODERN FORM OF SLAVERY, supra note 12, at 24-29 
(1993).
22See Mario Scarpati, Preliminary Results of a Study on the Profile 
of CSEC Clients:  Sex Tourists and Internet Users, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
REGIONAL CONSULTATION FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ON THE PROTECTION 
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most tourists, the vast majority of sex tourists follow one of two typical 
routes:  organized tours and individually-planned vacations.  Both routes 
have been enhanced by globalization.  Those on organized tours avoid many 
of the risks faced by independent sex tourists, who must arrange their own 
travel and encounters with prostitutes.  Philippine Adventure Tours (which 
is no longer in business), provided a typical tour.  For less than $2000, a 
tourist could receive round-trip airfare, a hotel in Manila, and a guide tour of 
bars where he could obtain the services of a prostitute.23  A tour guide was 
even available to help the sex tourist negotiate with the prostitute or her 
procurer.  Other tour operators offer similar tours to Thailand for $1800-
$2500.24
Notwithstanding these organized tours, the majority of sex tourists are 
independent.  They travel alone,25 and find prostitutes on their own.  Those 
who travel alone face the risks associated with making their own 
arrangements, such as how much to pay or whom to bribe.26  For many, their 
activity is possible only because of the disparate elements that make up 
globalization, such as easy international travel and wealth disparities that 
help push children into prostitution.  But the improvement in information 
technology is likely the single most important factor in the explosion of sex 
tourism.  Usenet newsgroups provide a useful forum for sex tourists because 
most focus on a single topic and allow users to post information 
anonymously.  Although they are typically not secure--access is not 
restricted by password, for example--an estimated 1000 illegal pornographic 
OF CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL EXPLOITATION IN TOURISM 53-54 (2003) 
(reporting that 99% of clients of child sex workers are men).
23CAPTIVE DAUGHTERS, CD FACT SHEET 1:  SEX TOURS - A 
LEARNING MODEL (1999).
24Toddi Gutner & Ron Corben, Asian Sex Tours are an American 
Business, Too, BUS. WK., June 17, 1996.
25Joshua Kurlantzick, Harm's Way:  Child Sex Tourism Feeds 
Thailand's Economy, IN THESE TIMES, Aug. 7, 2000.
26See Kay Johnson, Pedophile Playground, TIME, Nov. 13, 2000, at 
29 (describing sex tourist’s unsuccessful attempt to bribe law enforcement 
officials and his subsequent conviction in local court); see also Teacher 
Jailed for Kiddie Porn, MELBOURNE HERALD SUN, Nov. 22, 2000, at 34 
(same).
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images are posted on newsgroups each week.27  Bulletin and message 
boards, which often require users to enter a password, ensuring an added 
layer of security, have become another important forum in which sex 
tourists can exchange information.28  On some message boards, users seek 
and provide information about the kinds of acts they desire from prostitutes 
and identify for others the names of prostitutes who are willing to engage in 
them.29  There is also information about the cost of the acts and even news 
about particular prostitutes.30  The various technologies allow sex tourists to 
gather all the information they need for a "successful" trip:  where to find 
prostitutes, where to stay to avoid discovery, how much to pay (depending 
on the status of the prostitute and the sexual act), and how much to bribe 
local law enforcement officials to avoid prosecution if caught.31
II. THEORIES OF OFFENDING AND DETERRENCE
None of the existing theories of offending and deterrence provides an 
adequate account of how we should address unwanted activity that crosses 
national boundaries as sex tourism does.  This Part focuses on the two 
dominant existing approaches to deterrence (and to understanding criminal 
behavior generally), economic analysis and sociological (or criminological) 
analysis, and examines their deficits in a globalized world.  Deterrence is to 
many the holy grail of criminal law policy.  Preventing the commission of a 
crime not only spares potential victims, it also reduces the costs to society of 
investigating, prosecuting, and punishing offenders.  The law-and-
economics approach to deterrence policy is to find just the right balance 
between the costs of enforcing the laws on the one hand and the severity of 
27See DONNA M. HUGHES, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE IMPACT OF THE 
USE OF NEW COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES ON 
TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 10 (May 2001).
28See id.
29See, e.g., COUNCIL OF EUROPE, FINAL REPORT:  GROUP OF 
SPECIALISTS ON THE IMPACT OF THE USE OF NEW INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGIES ON TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 18 (2003).
30See HUGHES, supra note 27, at 20.
31See Scott Worden, E-Trafficking, FOREIGN POLICY, March 2001, at 
92; Kurlantzick, supra note 24.
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the penalty for an unwanted activity on the other.  The goal is to reduce the 
activity to the desired level as efficiently as possible.  Underlying the law-
and-economics approach is the idea of rational choice, the assumption that 
individuals “are forward looking and behave so as to maximize their 
expected utility.”32
Sociologists have the same goal--reducing crime--but approach it by 
attempting to identify the myriad influences on a potential offender:  her 
choice of crime, her selection of victims, her relationships with other 
potential offenders, and a host of others.  This is, of course, immensely 
complicated, and has spawned a welter of writing.  Sociologists typically 
focus on individuals or small groups of offenders and try to uncover the 
many motivations that move every offender.  
Just as economists and sociologists have different approaches to 
understanding criminal behavior, so too they have different approaches to 
deterring offending behavior.  Economists typically focus on only two 
variables:  the level of investment in enforcing the law, and the severity of 
the legal sanctions that an offender faces upon conviction of a crime.  The 
solutions proposed by sociologists typically use a broader array of policy 
interventions.  To reduce crime, sociologists might suggest alleviating 
poverty, changing family dynamics, or improving education.  
In this Part I lay out the conventional analyses of deterrence and draw 
lessons from the various theories.  I start by describing the first law-and-
economic model, which weighs the utility that a person expects to receive 
from an activity against the costs of the activity.  The first models were 
followed by more complex analysis, including consideration of the 
substitution effect, which occurs when an offender responds to the rising 
cost of his preferred activity by abandoning it and moving into another 
activity, which may be equally harmful.  After describing the law-and-
economics approach, I consider sociological or criminological theories of 
deterrence.  These theories focus to varying degrees on individual traits that 
incline a person toward unwanted activity or environmental factors which 
might encourage criminal behavior.  Finally, I draw lessons from 
conventional approaches.  First, the law-and-economic model is useful 
because it helps to identify the costs associated with each choice.  By 
identifying these disincentives, policy makers can more accurately 
determine how to increase the costs of unwanted activity.  I use sociological 
theories and evidence to expand the list of costs beyond those considered by 
the law-and-economics models.  Second, I conclude that informal sanctions-
-those in addition to formal legal sanctions--are increasingly important and 
32STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC LAW 1 (2004).  
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must be included in any model.  Finally, I conclude that sociological models 
consider, in a way that law-and-economics does not, one of the 
consequences of globalization--that the transaction costs associated with 
unwanted activity have declined significantly, thereby changing the entire 
cost structure of criminal behavior.
A.  Economic Analysis and Deterrence
In the last forty years, some of the most important work on deterrence 
has been influenced by the insights of economists.  Gary Becker, in an 
article in 1968, initiated the modern use of economic analysis to study the 
criminal law.33  The goal of most writers has been to determine how to most 
efficiently deter crimes by setting an appropriately severe sanction and 
investing adequately in enforcement of the laws.  Becker argued that, for 
most potential law breakers, deterrence depended on a simple balance.34  On 
one side were the benefits that committing the act would bring to the law 
breaker.35  On the other side were the costs of the crime, which Becker 
defined as a function of the probability of detection and the severity of the 
expected legal sanction.36  Since Becker's influential work there have been 
many refinements, but most economic models of deterrence have contained 
the same simplifying assumptions and many of the same elements.
In this section, I trace the development of economic models of 
deterrence.  I begin by reviewing the first, simple models.  I then discuss an 
important addition to the model:  consideration of the substitution effect.  
Substitution occurs when the cost of the preferred activity goes up and the 
actor chooses to substitute a less costly activity in the place of the preferred 
activity.  As I will explain, the substitution effect is critically important to 
any discussion of transnational unwanted activity.
33Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:  An Economic Approach, 
76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).  Becker was not the first to apply economic 
analysis to the study of criminal law.  See, e.g., CESARE BECCARIA, ON 
CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS; JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW.  
34Becker, supra note 33, at 176 ("a person commits an offense if the 
expected utility to him exceeds the utility he could get by using his time and 
other resources at other activities").
35Id.
36Id. at 169.
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1. A Simple Model of Deterrence
Deterrence models typically involve a simple calculation:  a criminal 
will "commit the act if and only if his expected utility from doing so, taking 
into account his gain and the chance of his being caught and sanctioned, 
exceeds his utility if he does not commit the act."37  That is, a person 
considering whether to break the law weighs the benefit to him of the crime 
against the costs of committing the crime.38  The costs of committing a 
crime are the severity of the expected legal sanction and the likelihood that 
the criminal will suffer the sanction.39  Combining the two elements 
accounted for the intuition that potential criminals care about the severity of 
the sanction and the chance that they will actually suffer it, and that the two 
are closely linked.  Measures that increase the costs of committing a 
particular crime are assumed to make it less likely that a criminal will 
commit that crime, thereby contributing to deterrence.  The conventional 
model is useful because it highlights the two most important elements of the 
criminal law equation, not just for potential law breakers but for 
policymakers as well.  Both enforcement and severity carry substantial costs 
for society and the model is a way of seeking the most efficient level of 
investment in each element.40  A massive investment in enforcement will 
not operate as a significant deterrent if sentences are too low, and even a 
37A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of 
Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 47 (2000).  
38This is, of course, a version of rational choice theory.  There are 
many definitions of rational choice.  See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Rational 
Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998) 
(rationality means "choosing the best means to the chooser's ends"); A. 
MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 10 (2d. 
Ed. 1989) (economic analysis assumes "utility maximization," which means 
that "individuals ... maximize their benefits, less their costs").  What all the 
definitions have in common is the presumption "that individuals act so as to 
maximize their expected utility."  Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas Ulen, Law 
and Behavioral Science:  Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law 
and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1075 (2000).
39Becker, supra note 33, at 204.
40See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Law, 78 
J. POL. ECON. 526, 526-27 (1970) ("society must forego 'complete' 
enforcement' of the laws because enforcement is costly").
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severe sentence will be a weak deterrent if criminals know that they will not 
be caught.
2. The Substitution Effect
The conventional model has much to commend it, but it leaves out 
several important elements.  After Becker's groundbreaking work, others 
refined his model because it did not account for the full complexity of 
decision making.  One problem arises when two crimes, one of which 
causes substantially more harm than the other, are subject to the same 
penalty.  The fear is that increasing the costs associated with one crime may 
actually cause the incidence of another crime to go up.  According to the 
conventional model, in this circumstance a potential law breaker has no 
incentive to choose the less harmful of the two acts.  The problem is perhaps 
most salient when considering closely related activities that differ only in 
magnitude:  "If the offender will be executed for a minor assault and for a 
murder, there is no marginal deterrence to murder.  If the thief has his hand 
cut off for taking five dollars, he had just as well take $5,000."41  One 
response to the problem, which George Stigler called "marginal 
deterrence,"42 is to impose harsher penalties for more severe crimes to 
remove any incentive to commit a more severe version of the same crime.43
Marginal deterrence is most commonly discussed in terms of the 
severity of the penalty for unwanted acts.  Indeed, Stigler's discussion of 
marginal deterrence was a response to Becker's argument that penalties 
should always be set at the most severe level.  Becker's argument was that, 
because potential law breakers consider both the severity of the penalty and 
the probability of detection, and because it is less expensive to increase the 
severity of a penalty than it is to invest in more effective enforcement, 
increasing the severity of the penalty is a costless way to increase 
deterrence.  The costs associated with a crime can also be increased by 
making it more likely that the criminal will suffer the legal sanction by, for 
example, investing in greater enforcement.44
41Id. at 527.
42Id.
43See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 37, at 63 ("Deterrence of a 
more harmful act because its expected sanction exceeds that for a less 
harmful act is sometimes referred to as marginal deterrence").
44Dilip Mookherjee & I.P.L. Png, Marginal Deterrence in 
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Marginal deterrence is a version of the substitution effect, an idea central 
to economic theory.  To see the substitution effect in operation, suppose that 
a person derives the same level of satisfaction from two goods, and that the 
price of one of the goods rises.  If this increase prompts the person to 
consume more of the second good (which brings the same satisfaction but is 
now less expensive relative to the first), the two goods are considered 
substitutes.  For example, if the consumer enjoys plain pizza as much as she 
enjoys pizza with pepperoni, and the price of pepperoni pizza rises, her 
consumption of plain pizza will increase because she will substitute the 
cheaper (and equally satisfying) plain for pepperoni.45
Applied to criminal law, substitution analysis goes a step beyond 
marginal deterrence (which concerned itself with different versions of 
similar crimes) to ask if an enhanced penalty "for X will distort behavior 
and lead people to commit an altogether different crime (Y, Z, or some 
combination of the two)."46   When we shift our attention from crimes that 
vary only in magnitude, the importance of substitution as a separate 
consideration becomes even more clear.  The goal of deterrence, after all, is 
to raise the cost of committing a particular crime to the point at which a 
potential law breakers will conclude that the costs outweigh the benefits.  
Implicit in this model is the assumption (or hope) that the time spent on 
criminal activity would be spent on other, non-criminal pursuits.  
Substitution analysis recognizes that the opportunity set for potential law 
breakers includes both non-criminal and criminal activity.  Thus, an increase 
in the penalty for one crime might deter that crime and others closely linked 
to it--for example, causing a criminal to swear off theft of any kind, large 
sums and small--but might encourage the commission of other unrelated 
crimes like drug sales or assault.47  The goal of accounting for substitution is 
Enforcement of Law, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1039, 1040 (1994) ("In [the] context 
[of] marginal deterrence, stepping up enforcement against one level of 
activity may induce a switch to a more harmful act instead"); see also 
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 37, at 63 ("marginal deterrence can be 
promoted by increasing the probability of detection as well as the magnitude 
of sanctions").
45EARL L. GRINOLS, MICROECONOMICS 130-31 (1994).  See 
generally ROBERT H. FRANK, MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR 109-118 
(5th ed. 2003).
46Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 
2385, 2391 (1997).
47See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 37, at 63 (when a potential law 
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to set penalties and enforcement strategies at a level that will cause a 
decrease in all crimes, not merely displace criminal activity from one 
category of crime to another. 
B.  The Sociology of Offending and Deterrence
Sociologists typically approach anti-social or deviant behavior with a 
wider perspective.  Deterrence is just one of the many theories of offending 
within sociology.48  I will first sketch out some of the general trends in the 
sociological or criminological approach to crime, then I will focus on 
deterrence theory.  This is a vast field; my goal is to provide some examples 
of the richness of the sociological approach and then identify the ways that 
sociology can modify the law-and-economics model to help us arrive at a 
better a better approach to deterrence.   This approach can be divided into 
two very broad strands.  One emphasizes “theories of the person,” which 
focus on “enduring” individual traits that incline people to commit crimes 
through their lives.49  The other strand focuses on “theories of the 
environment, which attribute crime to circumstances and situations.”50
Perhaps the most influential criminological theory is Edward H. 
Sutherland’s theory of differential association.51  Sutherland argued that 
criminal behavior is learned, not the result of innate characteristics.52  His 
breaker has a choice of several harmful acts, "the threat of sanctions plays a 
role in addition to the usual one of deterring individuals from committing 
harmful acts:  for individuals who are not deterred, expected sanctions 
influence which harmful acts individuals choose to commit").
48For an excellent discussion of the ebb and flow of sociological 
theories of offending see RONALD L. AKERS, CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORIES:  
INTRODUCTION AND EVALUATION (1999).  See also John H. Laub, The Life 
Course of Criminology in the United States:  The American Society of 
Criminology 2003 Presidential Address, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2004). 
49Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, Personal Capital and 
Social Control:  The Deterrence Implications of a Theory of Individual 
Differences in Criminal Offending, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 581, 581-82 (1994).  
50Id. 
51See EDWARD H. SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY (4th 
Ed. 1947); see also AKERS, supra note 48, at 59-62.
52Id. at 6-7. 
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theory focused on relationships and argued that criminal behavior is learned 
“within intimate personal groups.”53  People learn both “techniques of 
committing the crime” and the “motives, drives, rationalizations, and 
attitudes” that encourage criminal behavior.54  He argued that people 
become criminals when the influences favoring criminal activity outweigh 
the influences favoring compliance with the law.55  Sutherland’s approach 
opened the field to inquiries about the nature and importance of social 
interactions.  Ronald L. Akers’s social learning theory built on and 
expanded Sutherland’s work.56  Akers’s work sought to explain the 
“variables that operate both to motivate and control criminal behavior.”57
One important element of Akers’s work is that it addressed both behavior 
and attitudes.  He argued that when a person commits a criminal act, the 
response to that act will affect his future behavior and it will affect his 
“definitions,” that is, his preferences and attitudes.58  Akers’s work is also 
important because it recognized the importance of a wide range of factors, 
such as a person’s religious beliefs, relationships with others, mental health, 
and many others.59   Another criminological theory relies on the idea of 
anomie, a concept taken from the work of Emile Durkheim, referring to a 
“state of normlessness or lack of social regulation.”60  Building on 
Durkheim’s work, Robert Merton focused the disjunction between the goals 
that most members of society hold and the means by which people can attain 
those goals.  Merton argued that socially-acceptable goals (like wealth or 
status) are strongly reinforced, but socially-acceptable means of achieving 
53Id. 
54Id.
55Id.; see also AKERS, supra note 48, at 61.
56RONALD L. AKERS, DEVIANT BEHAVIOR:  A SOCIAL LEARNING 
APPROACH (1973).
57 AKERS, supra note 48, at 63.
58RONALD L. AKERS, DEVIANT BEHAVIOR:  A SOCIAL LEARNING 
APPROACH 60 (3d ed. 1985).
59AKERS, supra note 48, at 62-67.
60AKERS, supra note 48, at 119.  See also EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE 
(John A. Spaulding & George Simpson, Free Press 1951) (1897). 
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those goals are not as well developed.61  Like Sutherland and Akers, Merton 
sought to explain the forces that shape both behavior and preferences.  
Deterrence theory is the closest criminological theory to a rational 
choice, law-and-economics model.62  It relies on rules to deter people from 
committing crimes, and does so by convincing potential law breakers that 
the benefits they would gain from crime would be outweighed by the pain 
they would suffer if caught.63  But when sociologists analyze deterrence 
theory, they do so in a different way than economists.  In the economic 
model, the cost of committing a crime is the expected legal sanction.64  As I 
explore more fully below, sociologists have a much broader conception of 
costs.  For example, they consider the effects of the way that those we care 
about react to our behavior and the way that individuals react to their own 
behavior (feelings of pride or guilt, for example).65  For sociologists who 
study deterrence, the issue is not just whether formal sanctions do or do not 
deter, but whether and how formal legal sanctions and informal social 
61Robert K. Merton, Social Structure and Anomie, 3 AM. SOC. REV. 
672, 677-78 (1938).
62Although I focus on those aspects of deterrence theory that rely on 
rational choice, not every vein of deterrence theory draws heavily on 
rational choice.  For example, some deterrence theorists focus on places and 
crimes, rather than on offenders.  These scholars consider the “spatial 
aspects of offences and offending” by looking at the “natural and built 
environment, the political, economic, social and cultural contexts of 
structures of areas and the actions of individuals and corporate bodies within 
areas.”  Anthony E. Bottoms & Paul Wiles, Explanations of Crime and 
Place, in CRIME, PLACE AND POLICING:  ESSAYS IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
CRIMINOLOGY 31 (David J. Evans, et al., eds. 1992).  
63Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence and Incapacitation, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 345 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998).  
64Harold G. Grasmick & Robert J. Bursik, Jr., Conscience, 
Significant Others, and Rational Choice:  Extending the Deterrence Model, 
24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 837, 839-840 (1990) (discussing the conventional 
economic deterrence model’s focus only on formal legal sanctions).
65See, e.g., Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction Threats 
and Appeals to Morality:  Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate 
Crime, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 549, 579 (1996); Grasmick & Bursik, Jr., 
supra note 64, at 840-41.
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sanctions combine to affect behavior.66
C.  The Lessons of Theory
In the end, the differences between the law-and-economics approach and 
the sociological approach are perhaps not as profound as they might first 
appear.  For example, there is no inherent contradiction between the 
hypothesis that individuals act so as to maximize their utility and the belief 
that poverty or abuse contributes to (or causes) criminal behavior.  The 
rationality hypothesis does not assume that people gain utility only from 
socially useful activities.  So some of the differences between law-and-
economics and sociology may have to do more with terminology than actual 
differences in theory.  
Nonetheless, some differences are meaningful to our inquiry.  Most 
fundamentally, the law-and-economics approach tries to explain offense 
behavior as a general matter and does not attempt to explain the preferences 
that individual offenders hold.67  Most law-and-economics models assume 
that preferences are fixed, and that people act rationally.  In addition, law-
and-economics aggregates people; it is not interested in individual 
differences, but in broader generalizations.  These assumptions limit the 
kinds of policy responses that a law-and-economics approach can support 
because any policy response must be broad enough to affect a vast number 
of potential offenders.68  Typically, the law-and-economics approach 
66See, e.g., Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the 
Outset of the Twenty-First Century, in CRIME AND JUSTICE:  A REVIEW OF 
RESEARCH  1 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998); Bradley R.E. Wright, et al., Does 
the Perceived Risk of Punishment Deter Criminally Prone Individuals?  
Rational Choice, Self-Control, and Crime, 41 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 180, 
205-06 (2004).
67Karl-Dieter Opp, The Economics of Crime and the Sociology of 
Deviant Behaviour:  A Theoretical Confrontation of Basic Proportion, 42 
KYKLOS 405, 424-25 (1989).  
68See generally James S. Coleman, The Impact of Gary Becker’s 
Work on Sociology, 36 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 169, 169-70 (1993) (economics 
uses “a narrow theoretical frame, self-consciously sacrificing much of the 
rich detail of social and economic activity in return for the power provided 
by a parsimonious theory” while sociology shows “an unwillingness to 
sacrifice the rich detail of social activity, and ... more interest in empirical 
description than in theoretical power”).
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suggests only two responses to deviant behavior:  changing enforcement 
priorities or changing the official sanction for criminal conduct.
The sociological approach is broader in that it considers a much greater 
number of ways to motivate individuals.  It does not assume that preferences 
are fixed; indeed, many of the policy responses recommended by 
sociologists or criminologists aim to change preferences.  But the broader 
focus comes at the cost of making many policy responses unrealistic.  It 
would be wonderful to end poverty, for example, and doing so might be the 
best way to reduce crime, but it is a tall order and not likely to provide 
comfort to policy makers who want faster and cheaper solutions.  
My goal is to try to learn from both the law-and-economics and 
sociological models, and examining sex tourism in detail will help do this.  
In the sections that follow, I draw lessons from both models for three main 
reasons.  One strength of the law-and-economics model is that it counts as 
costs the factors that make it less likely that a person will commit a crime.  
One weakness is that its list of costs is too often unrealistically (and 
unhelpfully) undeveloped.  The sociological model recognizes that every 
person has a different constellation of motivations and constraints and that 
different people are moved to avoid criminal behavior by different reasons.69
I therefore use the idea of costs, but expand the list of possible costs to 
include more factors.
A second reason to use ideas from both models is that globalization has 
changed the issues that are central to criminal behavior.  For reasons that I 
explain in detail below, formal sanctions are much less important than they 
used to be.  The basic law-and-economics model, which includes the 
expected formal sanction as one of its two costs, is therefore impractical.70
The sociological model recognizes the centrality of non-formal sanctions.71
69Some sociological models consider “constraints” on behavior that 
operate much as costs do in the economic models.  This approach is helpful, 
but does not go far enough because it too often lists constraints that are so 
idiosyncratic as to be unhelpful to policy makers.
70There are obviously many law-and-economics scholars whose 
work examines norms, and I draw on their work throughout this Article.  My 
point here is not to suggest that law-and-economics has ignored norms, but 
to suggest that the formal law-and-economics model has not accounted for 
the insights of norms scholars, and that norms are more important to 
transnational activity than previously thought.
71See, e.g., AKERS, supra note 48, at 22.  Indeed, some argue that 
non-formal sanctions are more important than formal sanctions.  See, e.g., 
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Both models provide some insights into the complicated ways that non-
formal sanctions can interact with formal sanctions, and I explore this issue 
in detail.
Finally, as the sex tourism example makes clear, globalization has 
reduced the transaction costs of crime radically.  Transactions costs operated 
as an uncounted but powerful constraint on criminal behavior, and their 
reduction has changed the calculus of many potential offenders.72  The 
sociological approach recognizes this in a way that law-and-economics does 
not.  Gathering information about new offenses and modifying preferences 
regarding new offenses are important to any discussion of deterrence, and 
the sociological model provides valuable insights on these processes.  
III. DETERRENCE AND SUBSTITUTION IN THE REAL WORLD
Most deterrence policy relies on the typical economic model.  When 
policymakers want to attack crime, they typically see themselves as having 
two levers to pull, sanctions and deployment of law enforcement resources.  
Because this formulation implicitly adopts the law-and-economics model, it 
is important to take a close look at the assumptions and mechanics of the 
law-and-economics approach.  No one who uses economic models really 
thinks that they precisely predict human behavior; most models incorporate 
too many simplifications and occasionally unrealistic assumptions to be 
accurate.  Models are useful because they help identify assumptions, 
describe relationships between variables, and map a complicated transaction 
in a simple, useful way.  They identify the broad structure and basic 
components, but they are often crude and do not fit specific situations well.  
Recently there has been an attempt to introduce insights drawn from 
cognitive psychology, sociology, and other disciplines to challenge, or at 
least modify, the assumptions of the rational choice model.73  The goal of 
these attempts is to "modify the implausible elements of rational choice 
theory and supplement the inadequate elements in order to create a tool with 
Grasmick & Bursik, supra note 64, at 837. Others argue that formal 
sanctions are most important when they trigger non-formal sanctions.  See, 
e.g., Kirk R. Williams & Richard Hawkins, The Meaning of Arrest for Wife 
Assault, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 163 (1989).
72See Opp, supra note 67, at 410.
73See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 38, at 1051; Christine Jolls, 
Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Kahan, supra note 4, at 2477.
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more predictive power in specific situations."74
A.  The Problem:  Transnational Crime Requires a New Model of 
Deterrence
None of this work has attempted to account for the changes brought by 
globalization.75 The goal of this Article is to modify the deterrence and 
substitution models to make them more powerful tools for shaping 
transnational deterrence policy.  I do this by adding two important and as-
yet unexplored refinements to the conventional model of deterrence to better 
account for the complexity of transnational activity.  First, I argue that 
traditional deterrence models combine two variables that must be separated 
and analyzed as distinct costs.  Most deterrence models consider the 
"probability of apprehension and conviction"76 to be a single, unitary cost.  
Although this might be a rational simplifying assumption for domestic crime 
(at least in the United States), it is not appropriate for a globalized world in 
which unwanted activity crosses borders.  This is true for two primary 
reasons.  To begin, the conventional model implicitly assumes that the legal 
sanction is the only sanction; that the only costs imposed on people who 
engage in unwanted activity are those imposed by the state.  This is not the 
case.  Although legal sanctions are obviously important, the threat or 
imposition of non-legal sanctions are also important costs, and can act as 
deterrents to unwanted activity.  Such sanctions could take the form of a 
reduction in public reputation or esteem, or the internal guilt associated with 
being associated with an accusation that the person engaged in activity that 
violated social norms.  Accounting for these costs in the deterrence 
74Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 38, at 1074-75.
75Recall that, for my purposes, globalization means the closer 
integration of the countries and peoples of the world brought about by many 
factors, chief among them a significant and rapid reduction in costs of 
transportation and communication.  See STIGLITZ, supra note 8, at 9.  As I 
use the term, I mean more than just economic globalization, which is 
concerned mostly with the process and results of linking national economies 
together into a unified (or at least partly unified) global economy.  See
JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 3-4 (2004).  I also 
include cultural and social integration, travel for purposes in addition to 
business, and exchanges of information among people from different parts 
of the globe.  
76Becker, supra note 33, at 204.
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calculation is complicated, but necessary.   
The second refinement I make is to recognize that substitution or 
displacement is a process, not a simple act.  Briefly stated, substitution 
occurs when the costs associated with an activity increase and the actor 
decides either to engage in a different activity or to engage in the same 
activity in a different place.  Thus, if the penalty for the preferred crime rises 
sharply, then an actor may substitute another activity--either a lawful 
activity or a different, less-costly crime--for the preferred crime.  
Conventional deterrence analysis treats substitution or displacement as a 
costless transaction.  As I will show, it is a complicated transaction that 
carries within it substantial costs.  If, for example, a sex tourist decides that 
the cost of engaging in sexual activity with children has gotten too high in 
the U.S., he might decide to travel to another country.  The costs associated 
with this move can be significant, ranging from the practical costs of 
gathering information about a new place and engaging with his victims to 
the losses involved with abandoning the sunk costs associated with 
developing the expertise that allowed him to engage in the original behavior.  
Finally, before moving on, a short explanation of why we should attend 
to the possibility of substitution, and why we should do so through legal 
rules (or purposeful attempts to alter norms), is in order.  There are three 
main reasons, one theoretical, one normative and one much more practical.  
The theoretical reason is that because the entities affected by transnational 
crime are widely dispersed and lack sufficient information, legal rules are 
the best way to account for substitution.  The normative reason is that 
because substitution is often geographic, the consequences of U.S. and 
European regulation are felt in other parts of the world as harms.  The 
practical reason is that deterrence policy should fully explore all the costs in 
a criminal transaction as a way of identifying those costs that can be 
increased in an effort to reduce crime.
One of the consequences of globalization is that in some instances 
geography matters less than it used to.  As discussed above, if the costs 
associated with an activity rise in the U.S., those who wish to pursue the 
activity can easily travel to another part of the world where the activity is 
less expensive.  Sometimes this migration is intentional.  The source country 
might intentionally increase the costs associated with an activity so as to 
drive it out of the country, or the destination country might strategically 
modify its regulations to attract the activity.  When this happens in 
commercial relations, it can often be a good thing.  For example, some 
scholars argue that regulatory competition in Europe helped to develop the 
economy as leaders pursued policies to encourage commercial enterprises to 
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locate in their territory rather than in a rival’s.77
Not every migration of activity is beneficent or caused by intentional 
policy shifts.  Sex tourism is an obvious example.  When the activity 
migrates not because of a purposeful modification of regulation but as an 
unintended side-effect of a policy, it is helpful to think of the migration as 
an externality.  In economic terms, an externality occurs when “production 
or consumption activities involve benefits or costs that fall on people not 
directly involved in the activities.”78  The problem is that because the costs 
of the activity are not paid by those considering whether to engage in it, 
there is a chance that there will be too much or too little of the activity.79
Put another way, if one goal of deterrence policy is to decrease the incidence 
of undesirable behavior, not merely to move it from one place to another, we 
must look at the effects of regulation not just in the place where the 
regulation is imposed, but elsewhere as well.  This poses a fundamental 
problem, because “it will be socially desirable for individuals to engage less 
often in acts that cause detrimental effects than is in their immediate self-
interest.”80  To analogize this to the sex tourism example,81 when countries 
that are able to effectively regulate illicit sexual behavior do so (out of their 
immediate self-interest, of course), they cause harm in the developing world.  
Economists recognize that the best way to account for externalities is for 
the parties involved to communicate with each other and arrive at a 
mutually-beneficial agreement.82  They also recognize that there are often 
77See MARTIN WOLF, WHY GLOBALIZATION WORKS 26-28 (2004).  
78FRANK, supra note 45, at 613.  
79MATTHEW BISHOP, ESSENTIAL ECONOMICS 95 (2004).
80SHAVELL, supra note 32, at 80.  
81This is not, of course, a perfect analogy.  To be clear--I do not 
argue that the U.S. and Europe engage in too much regulation of illicit 
sexual activity, or that they should not regulate such behavior.  I argue 
instead that they engage in the wrong kind of (or even insufficient) 
regulation.  I argue that the U.S. and Europe have not fully accounted for the 
consequences of their regulations, and that the solution is not to decrease 
their regulation of illicit sexual activity, but to increase the scope of their 
regulation to capture, or internalize, as much of the displaced activity as 
possible.
82SHAVELL, supra note 32, at 81-87.
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significant impediments to this process.83  There are a number of reasons 
why such communication may not occur.  Among the reasons are that it is 
difficult or impractical for parties to communicate, that the number of 
entities with an interest in the situation is so high that bargaining is difficult, 
that the party causing the harm does not recognize the harm (or that the 
party suffering the harm does not know where it came from), or that 
everyone knows from the beginning that any discussions are likely to fail.84
Considered through the lens of the sex tourism example, it is clear that 
activity that crosses borders is susceptible to many of these impediments to 
bargaining.  There are many interested parties spread around the globe and 
many of them do not have adequate information about the consequences of 
their activity or the sources of the harm that befalls them.  It is in situations 
like this, in which bargaining is unlikely to occur and, if it does happen, 
unlikely to succeed, that economists recommend legal rules as a way alter 
undesirable or sub-optimal behavior.  To summarize this point--the 
theoretical reason that we should account for substitution through legal rules 
is because sex tourist source countries (and, in the U.S., the states) and 
destination countries are unable to efficiently negotiate, and because neither 
side has the necessary information, displacement should be addressed 
through changes to legal rules or purposeful attempts to change norms, 
rather than leaving it to the affected parties to work out.
The normative reason that we should attend to substitution is much 
easier to state:  those who cause harm should pay for it.  This normative 
version of the economic argument that actors should seek to account for 
externalities has a long pedigree.  Lord Bramwell, the 19th Century English 
jurist, famously wrote that “It is for the public benefit that trains should run; 
but not unless they pay their expenses.”85  He argued that the costs of a 
public benefit should be borne by those who enjoy the benefits, not by 
individuals without compensation.86  The economic case thus focuses on 
supply; if the true costs of an activity are not borne by those who benefit 
from it but instead shifted to someone else, the beneficiaries will engage in 
too much of it.  The normative argument is simpler:  it is fundamentally 
83Id. at 87-92.
84Id. at 88.
85Bamford v. Turnley, 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 33 (1862).  
86See Anita Ramasastry, The Parameters, Progressions, and 
Paradoxes of Baron Bramwell, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 322, 326 (1994); P.S. 
Atiyah, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 389-380 (1979).
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unfair for one party to force another to pay for the first party’s pleasure.  
There are a couple of practical reasons that we should pay attention to 
substitution.  The first is what some refer to as “blowback,” purportedly “a 
CIA term of art for the unintended, even ironic consequences of intelligence 
operations.”87  Blowback refers to the risk that policy measures that attempt 
to fix one problem can create another.  The most commonly-cited example 
comes from events that followed the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.  
During the occupation, the U.S. provided arms to Osama bin Laden and his 
allies to fight the Soviets.  After the occupation, bin Laden and his allies 
used those same weapons against U.S. forces and interests.88  The point is 
that policies, even those intended to do good, can cause unanticipated harm, 
and that self interest (apart from any concern for those affected by the 
policies) should compel us to consider those harms.  
A second practical reason to consider substitution is that it can help 
reduce unwanted behavior.  By definition, those who substitute out of their 
preferred activity to another activity have been at least partially deterred.  
Some substitute into desirable activities and some into unwanted activities.  
Those who go to new undesirable activities are forced to give up valuable 
expertise, making them vulnerable to detection.  Thus even if policies result 
in substitution, they can still be effective.  Accounting for substitution is a 
way to make policies more effective by attempting to predict the quantity 
and direction of substitution.  Imagine that the U.S. government clamps 
down on illicit sexual activity.  Some of those who engaged in the activity 
decide to quit and do something else.  Some decide to try to find the same 
activity in another location.  The nations affected, either as the source of 
those who wish to engage in the activity or their likely destination, would 
surely like to be able to predict where those who were not completely 
deterred were likely to go, and which of them was likely to travel.  This 
information could lead to better coordination and widen the reach of law 
enforcement to capture more of the unwanted activity.  Accounting for 
displacement does not mean avoiding it at all costs; instead, it means 
recognizing that it can occur and taking additional steps to capture some of 
the displaced activity.
87James A. Nathan, El Dorado Canyon:  Reagan’s Undeclared War 
with Qaddafi, 33 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 935 (2003); see also CHALMERS 
JOHNSON, BLOWBACK:  THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN 
EMPIRE (2d ed. 2004).  
88See Evan Thomas, The Road to September 11, TIME, Oct. 1, 2001, 
at 38.
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B.  Displacement:  Sex Tourism and Other Real-World Examples
Researchers and law enforcement officials have long recognized the 
potential for displacement.  Displacement comes in many forms, but all 
occur when some kind of enforcement action prevents a potential offender 
from doing what he wants, when he wants, where he wants, and in the way 
he wants.89  Displacement can be geographic, in which case criminal activity 
is driven from one place to another; “tactical,” in which case the criminal 
changes methods but not crimes; or substantial, in which case the offender 
changes crimes entirely.90  There is evidence suggesting that geographic 
displacement can occur.  For example, when the police crack down on a 
drug market in one neighborhood, sellers may move to an adjacent 
neighborhood.91  There is also evidence regarding substantial displacement; 
that is, the risk that offenders may switch from one crime to another.  The 
evidence on this issue is complicated.  For example, a population of 
offenders whose preferred crime was credit card fraud encountered new 
technologies that should have made it profitable for them to switch to a 
related crime.92  They did not do so, for at least two reasons.  First, the 
payoff from the new crime, even with the new technology, was simply not 
high enough to justify the switch.93  Second, the second crime was tightly 
controlled by an ethnically-defined criminal syndicate, which did not permit 
89Lorraine Green Mazerrole, et al., Civil Remedies and Drug 
Control:  A Randomized Field Trial in Oakland, California, 24 
EVALUATION REV. 212, 232 (2000).
90Id. at 232 citing Thomas Gabor, Crime Displacement:  The 
Literature and Strategies for its Investigation, 6 CRIME ET JUSTICE 100 
(1978) and Thomas A. Reppetto, Crime Prevention and the Displacement 
Phenomenon, 22 CRIME & DELINQ. 166, 168-69 (1976).
91Evan Wood, et al., Displacement of Canada’s Largest Public Illicit 
Drug Market in Response to a Police Crackdown, 170 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 
1151, 1154-55 (2004).
92See Francois Mativat & Pierre Tremblay, Counterfeiting Credit 
Cards:  Displacement Effects, Suitable Offenders and Crime Wave Patterns, 
37 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 165 (1997).
93Id. at 181.
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members of other ethnic groups to engage in the activity.94
These two real-world examples of displacement are helpful for several 
reasons.  First, they demonstrate that displacement can, under certain 
conditions occur.  Second, they demonstrate that demand can be stronger 
than enforcement efforts; in other words, if demand is sufficiently inelastic, 
then displacement is more likely than if demand is very sensitive to 
increases in price.  Third, displacement can actually increase harm if it 
forces criminals into a new location, one where law enforcement officials 
are not prepared to combat the new crime and where social rules against the 
activity are not sufficiently strong to prevent the creation of a new group of 
consumers.  Finally, they show that displacement is both complicated and 
difficult.  It is not the costless transaction that some law-and-economics 
theorists seem to assume, and it can be disrupted in some cases. 
Other areas of criminal behavior have also exhibited what looks like a 
substitution effect.  One useful example is international terrorism, which has 
long been a transnational phenomenon, making it perhaps the closest 
analogy to sex tourism.  The modern history of terrorist activity shows that 
differences in the effectiveness of regulation have caused terrorists to 
migrate to the areas of lowest regulation.95  There is evidence, for example, 
that “the installation of metal detectors in airports” that began in 1973 “had 
primarily a substitution effect” because the policy made airplane hijackings 
more difficult, but encouraged terrorists to substitute into other kinds of 
terrorist activities.96
One reason for the substitution was that, although the change in policy 
that caused substitution drove up the cost of one kind of terrorist act, it did 
not affect the "resources, knowledge, or wherewithal"97 of those wishing to 
engage in terrorist acts.  Terrorists still had the desire and means to engage 
in terrorism even if their preferred venue was no longer available.  
Researchers concluded that in the case of terrorism an effective policy 
94Id.
95Eric Iksoon Im, Jon Cauley & Todd Sandler, Cycles and 
Substitutions in Terrorist Activities:  A Spectral Approach, 40 KYKLOS 238, 
250-51 (1987).
96Walter Enders & Todd Sanders, What Do We Know about the 
Substitution Effect in Transnational Terrorism?, in RESEARCHING 
TERRORISM:  TRENDS, ACHIEVEMENTS AND FAILURES 119, 131 (Andrew 
Silke ed., 2004).
97Id.
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intervention must "increase the cost of all terrorist modes of operation 
simultaneously."98  An effective deterrent must not only disrupt the specific 
activity, it must also disrupt its component parts.
Finally, there is evidence that sex tourism is an example of 
displacement.  There has been a substantial increase in prosecutions for 
illicit sexual activity in the United States, and a corresponding decrease in 
the number of reported victims of such crimes.  Taken alone, this evidence 
tells a welcome story for the U.S.  But when considered in light of the other 
evidence I present, the story becomes more complicated.  Effective 
regulation in the U.S. may lead to substitution or displacement, encouraging 
those who want to engage in the activity to seek other venues.  In economic 
terms, this means that the cost of the activity has risen in the U.S. and has 
led those who wish to engage in it to seek less expensive alternatives.
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One piece of the evidence comes from statistics showing that 
prosecutions for similar crimes in the U.S. have increased.  Prosecutions in 
U.S. District Courts of cases involving the sexual exploitation of children 
rose every year between 1994 and 2002.  The first table below shows the 
number of prosecutions for the sexual exploitation of children.99  Table 2 
shows the increase in prosecutions for the transportation of minors (and 
others) for sexual purposes.100  Both tables show a sharp increase in 
prosecutions in the past decade.  Neither table is a perfect measure of the 
behavior that underlies sex tourism, but taken together they support the 
99The table includes cases prosecuted under four statutes:  18 
U.S.C.A. § 2251 prohibits the sexual exploitation of children; 18 U.S.C.A. § 
2251A prohibits buying or selling children; and 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2252 & 
2252A prohibit the production, transportation, receipt or possession of 
sexually explicit material involving children.
100Table 2 includes cases prosecuted under three statutes:  18 
U.S.C.A. § 2421 prohibits the transportation of any person in interstate or 
foreign commerce with the intent that the person engage in prostitution; 18 
U.S.C.A. § 2422 prohibits the entice or coercion of any person to travel for 
the purposes of engaging in prostitution; and 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423 prohibits 
travel in interstate or foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit 
sex and making arrangements for others to do so.
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inference that the sexual activity that underlies much of sex tourism is 
increasingly effectively regulated in the U.S.
Tables 1 and 2 reflect prosecutions in federal court.  But the majority of 
sex offenses, like all criminal cases, are prosecuted in state courts.101  When 
we examine state records, there is a looser fit between the available evidence 
and the argument that effective regulation has displaced the activity, but 
there is support for the point.  Between 1991 and 2001, the number of 
reported rapes declined 26%.102  The victimization rate for children under 
twelve fell approximately 71% in the same period.103  During this time, the 
victimization rate for all victims, including those under 12, fell 
approximately 42%.  Again the data are not perfect, but the fact that there 
are fewer victims of sexual assault, and fewer child victims of all crimes, 
supports the inference that the behavior that underlies sex tourism has 
decreased in the U.S.  
There is strong anecdotal evidence to support this inference.  Two recent 
reports, "The Decline in Child Sexual Abuse Cases," written in 2001 for the
U.S. Department of Justice,104 and "Sexual Abuse Decline in the 1990s:  
Evidence for Possible Causes,"105 produced for the Crimes against Children 
Research Center at the University of New Hampshire, both draw on 
evidence from a variety of sources that points to a sharp decrease in sexual 
abuse of children in the U.S. in the past decade.  Although the authors 
disagree about the reasons for the decline, they conclude that the evidence 
indicates that there has been decline of approximately 39%.106
Taken together, evidence of a significant increase in prosecutions for 
101AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 3 (reporting that only 
4% of all crimes in the United States are prosecuted in federal court).
102NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF 
STATE COURTS 2002, PART II:  EXAMINING SERIOUS CRIME 85 (2002).
103Id. at 86. 
104LISA JONES & DAVID FINKELHOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
THE DECLINE IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES (2001).
105DAVID FINKELHOR & LISA M. JONES, CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN 
RESEARCH CENTER, SEXUAL ABUSE DECLINE IN THE 1990S:  EVIDENCE FOR 
POSSIBLE CAUSES.  Interestingly, displacement is not considered as a 
possible cause.
106Id. at 1.
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sexual abuse crimes, and a significant decrease in the number of reported 
victims of such abuse suggest that the cost in terms of likely prosecution has 
increased and may have contributed to the corresponding decline in the 
incidence of the behavior, at least in the U.S.  This evidence does not, 
however, tell us anything about whether the activity has declined overall or 
has been displaced from the U.S. to other countries.  
Displacement of illicit sexual activity can occur only if individuals can 
travel cheaply to common destination countries.  A study of changes in 
travel patterns between Europe and the U.S. and common destination 
countries reveals helpful but not conclusive evidence.  As shown in Table 3, 
between 1995 and 1999, there was a significant increase in travel from 
Europe and the Americas107 to three common sex tourism destination 
countries.108
Percentage Increase in Tourists Arriving Between 1995 and 1999
Cambodia Philippines Thailand
Europe 36.37% 26.78% 21.26%
Americas 38.89% 21.09% 30.49%
In addition, there is reason to believe that the statistics do not capture the 
entire increase.  Although the numbers show an increase in travel from 
source countries to destination countries, they do not show the proportion of 
sex tourists to business travelers and ordinary vacationers.  But there is 
anecdotal evidence that as a location gains a reputation as a sex tour 
destination, ordinary tourists begin to stay away.109  Thus the percentage 
107The most reliable statistics available, from the World Tourism 
Organization, group together all travelers from the Americas.
108WORLD TOURISM ORGANIZATION, COMPENDIUM OF TOURISM 
STATISTICS 34 (Cambodia), 147 (Philippines), 182 (Thailand) (2001).
109There appears to be a kind of tipping point with tourism 
destinations, after which the proportion of legitimate tourists begins to 
decline.  There is evidence that this has occurred in Thailand, for example, 
with “couples, families, and culture-motivated travelers” staying away 
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increase in sex tourists is likely higher than the increase in total tourists to 
destination countries because as the number of sex tourists rises, the 
concentration of sex tourists increases even more.
C.  Discovery, Prosecution, and Sanctions
Whether a person is deterred from committing a crime depends in great 
measure on what he thinks will happen after the crime.  How much will he 
benefit from the crime?  How likely is it that he will be caught?  If he is 
caught, then what--will he be embarrassed, praised, prosecuted?  If he is 
prosecuted, what will the sanction be?  This complicated calculation must, 
of course, be simplified in any economic model.  Most scholars follow the 
lead of Gary Becker, who treated the probability of apprehension and 
conviction as a single variable, and assumed that "only convicted offenders 
are punished."110  The two steps--first apprehension, then conviction--are 
not separated.  Although this might be a reasonable simplifying assumption 
in the U.S.,111 it is unreasonable with respect to transnational activity, where 
it is not at all clear that apprehension will be followed by conviction or 
social disapprobation.112  Any deterrence model that leaves out the role of 
“because of the sleazy reputations of its cities.”  LINDA K. RICHTER, THE 
POLITICS OF TOURISM IN ASIA 100 (1989).  See also Donna Tunney, Travel's 
Dirty Little Secret, 60 TRAVEL WKLY. 38, Aug. 6, 2001 (describing 
reluctance of ordinary tourists to return to location at which other tourists 
engaged in lascivious behavior).  From the vantage of many potential sex 
tourists, once a destination “tips” toward sex tourism and fewer legitimate 
tourists arrive, the destination might be even more attractive.  For individual 
offenders, the expected payoff for a crime is higher if other people also 
commit the same offense in the same location and thereby tax police 
resources.   See Peter-J. Jost, Crime, Coordination and Punishment:  An 
Economic Analysis, 21 INT’L REV.  L. & ECON. 23, 25 (2001).
110Becker, supra note 33, at 177.
111In state courts (which handle the vast majority of criminal cases), 
60% of suspects arrested for homicide are convicted, and 94% of those are 
sent to prison.  For rape, 45% of those arrested are convicted and 70% go to 
prison.  For robbery, 44% of those arrested are convicted, and 75% go to 
prison.  NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 102, at 89 
(2002).
112See, e.g., Cathy Scott-Clark & Adrian Levy, The Brothel King's 
Revenge, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb. 21, 2004 (owner of largest sex club in 
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social norms in governing personal behavior is inadequate.  In this section I
attempt to consider more fully the range of costs facing a potential criminal.
Deterrence analysis that follows the law-and-economics model holds 
that if the benefit of an illegal activity outweighs the likelihood of detection 
and the expected legal sanction, then a person will choose to commit the 
crime.  In this model, the only cost to the potential lawbreaker is the 
expected legal sanction (as modified by the probability of detection).  This 
simple model leaves out the important role of social norms.  Norms are 
"informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because 
of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-legal 
sanctions, or both."113  There is much debate about how norms emerge--
from a person's desire to signal to others that she is a worthy partner for 
future interaction,114 from a desire for the esteem of others,115 or from an 
internalized understanding that cooperation is best so long as others also 
cooperate.116  There is, of course, a complicated relationship between norms 
and the law.  Some argue that one important function of the law is 
"expressive:"  by adding the voice of the state on the side of an existing 
social norm, the law can create or strengthen the norm (or weaken the norm 
by contradicting it).117  Others argue that the law is, in many circumstances, 
made much less relevant by the existence of well-known, efficient norms.118
Bangkok reporting that he had paid bribes to the police of at least £1.5 
million); PASUK PHONGPAICHIT ET AL., CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
IN THAILAND:  PERCEPTIONS AND EXPERIENCE OF HOUSEHOLDS 37 (2000) 
(indicating that the police solicited bribes from 9% of visitors); Nualnoi 
Teerat, Thailand:  Fight against Corruption (2004), at 
www.fes.or.kr/Corruption/papers/Thailand.htm (last visited March 29, 
2004).
113Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation 
of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 340 (1997).
114ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 11-35 (2000).
115
 McAdams, supra note 113, at 340.
116Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating?  A Response to Eric 
Posner's Law and Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367 (2002).
117Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. 
L. REV. 2021 (1996).
118ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:  HOW NEIGHBORS 
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Despite the variety of approaches in the norms literature, what is clear is that 
norms matter to law, and that if they are consistent with the law, they can 
supplement the law's deterrent power.  
Given the connection between norms and the law, and particularly 
between norms and deterrence, it is strange that norms are not considered 
more central to the deterrence model.  To be sure, there is much discussion 
of the role of norms in deterrence,119 but this discussion mostly focuses on 
the role of norms as independent mechanisms to deter crime.  What is left 
out is a consideration of norms as an element of the deterrence model.120
Because engaging in behavior that would violate an internalized norm raises 
the cost of unwanted activity, the violation of norms should be included as a 
cost in the deterrence model. 
Despite the literature linking law and norms, the implicit assumption 
often seems to be that, for people willing to commit one crime, all other 
crimes are, in effect, moral substitutes. That is, that apart from differences in 
penalty or likelihood of enforcement, a person willing to commit theft 
would also be willing to commit rape.  Underlying this assumption is the 
belief that people either are or are not criminals.  If a person is a criminal, 
then he must not be influenced at all by positive social norms (those against 
committing crimes) or he must be exclusively influenced by negative social 
norms (those that encourage or excuse criminal behavior).121  Put another 
way, the law-and-economics approach assumes that "[i]f the thief has his 
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991)
119See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and 
Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 350 (1997).
120Neal Katyal, among others, has argued that the violation of a norm 
can lead to stigmatization, which can, for a variety of reasons, lead to 
greater criminality.  Katyal, supra note 46, at 2457-61.  This argument, 
however, identifies a different cost of violating a norm, and does not 
integrate it into the deterrence or substitution model.
121There is empirical support for the argument that because different 
crimes are governed by different norms, offenders willing to commit one 
crime may be unwilling to commit another, even one that is closely related 
to the first.  See James J. Teevan & Heather B. Dryburgh, First Person 
Accounts and Sociological Explanations of Delinquency, 37 CAN. REV. SOC. 
& ANTHROPOLOGY 77, 89 (2000) (“Some respondents see theft from large 
stores as justified because the stores are making huge profits, whereas theft 
from individuals, friends, or family is seen to be wrong”).
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hand cut off for taking five dollars, he has just as well take $5,000."122  The 
assumption that people who are willing to commit a particular crime are 
immune to all norms is at odds with human behavior.  A thief who is willing 
to steal five dollars might not steal $5000--regardless of the penalty--
because he, like many people, had internalized the idea that there are 
degrees of wrong.  In other words, he might have been willing to violate a 
norm against stealing a small amount of money, but still be unwilling to 
violate a different norm against stealing a much larger amount.  
Criminologists have begun to investigate this insight.  In addition to 
weighing formal sanctions, those who are considering criminal activity also 
weigh the informal sanctions that might flow from their behavior.  
Criminologists focus on two informal costs, the “shame for doing something 
the actor considers morally wrong,”123 and “social censure or disapproval by 
significant others.”124  Both have the potential to shape behavior and 
encourage or discourage compliance with the law.125  The research suggests 
that all potential costs work together much in the way that the law-and-
economics model would suggest, but that the equation is complicated.  The 
evidence supports the hypothesis that people considering whether to commit 
a criminal act do engage in the kind of weighing of costs and benefits that 
Gary Becker suggested in his groundbreaking work.126  But the evidence 
122Stigler, supra note 40, at 527.
123Grasmick & Bursik, Jr., supra note 64, at 840.
124Ronet Bachman, et al., The Rationality of Sexual Offending:  
Testing a Deterrence/Rational Choice Conception of Sexual Assault, 26 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 343, 355 (1992).
125Some research suggests that both costs are important and 
powerful.  See, e.g., Raymond Paternoster, et al., Perceived Risk and Social 
Control:  Do Sanctions Really Deter?, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457 (1983).  
More recent research suggests that moral costs, that is, feelings of guilt or 
shame that result from violating an internal rule or moral code, are the much 
more powerful force.  See, e.g., Grasmick & Bursik, Jr., supra note 64, at 
853-54; Ronet Bachman, et al., supra note 124, at 365.  What these studies 
highlight is the importance of including informal sanctions in the deterrence 
calculus.
126See, e.g., Bradley R.E. Wright, et al., Does the Perceived Risk of 
Punishment Deter Criminally Prone Individuals?  Rational Choice, Self-
Control, and Crime, 41 JOURNAL OF RESEARCH IN CRIME & DELINQUENCY 
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also suggests that people include the costs associated with informal 
sanctions in the calculation along with the costs associated with formal 
sanctions.127  Interestingly, the research also suggests that informal sanctions 
influence the importance of formal sanctions.128  Thus informal sanctions 
operate as both “a powerful and independent source of social control, they 
also condition the impact of more rational factors,” which include formal 
legal sanctions.129  In some circumstances, internal moral rules can trump 
more practical considerations (such as the likelihood of detection or the 
likely legal sanction).  In other circumstances, where moral rules exert less 
influence, utility calculations are more important.130
An important subsidiary consideration is the potential offender’s 
perception of the risk of suffering a sanction for his misbehavior.  In other 
words, costs influence behavior only if potential offenders are aware of 
them.  The evidence suggests that “people who perceive that sanction risks 
and costs are higher” commit fewer crimes.131  But recognizing this fact is 
just the beginning of the analysis.  More important is to consider whether 
“the perceptions are themselves manipulable by policy.”132  The task then is 
to construct policies that can influence a potential law breaker’s perception 
of how likely he is to be caught, and what the likely sanctions for his 
misbehavior will be.  Some of the difficulty of this task is explained by the 
status and community issues discussed below.  When potential law breakers 
receive signals that their conduct is common and unlikely to result in a 
sanction, they are more likely to engage in the conduct.133  But the first step 
in setting effective policies is to recognize what they must accomplish and 
the multitude of approaches that they should take.
The decision to commit a crime is complicated, and influenced by many 
factors, among them the probability of being caught, the expected legal 
180, 205-06 (2004); Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 65, at 579.
127See, e.g., Grasmick & Bursik, Jr., supra note 64, at 853-54.
128See Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 65, at 579.
129Id..
130Id.
131Nagin, supra note 66, at 2-3.
132Id. at 5.
133See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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sanction, the probability of actually suffering the legal sanction, and social 
norms.  Norms against committing a crime must be stacked next to the other 
reasons that person might commit a crime.   It is wrong to assume that 
persons who have decided to commit a crime are not influenced by positive 
norms.  They may not be completely deterred by the norm, but they are as 
likely to be influenced by a positive norm as any other person.  In economic 
terms, the decision to violate a norm is a cost--perhaps substantial, perhaps 
negligible--that must be accounted for in the economic deterrence model.   
Depending upon who discovers the suspect, apprehension (or discovery), 
can subject the person to significant social sanctions like loss of reputation, 
ostracism, or disruptions to family or employment dynamics.  The 
likelihood of suffering these sanctions is surely a consideration for a person 
weighing whether to commit a transnational crime.  Whether this cost is 
high or low depends in large part on the extent to which the suspect is 
connected to the community in which he is apprehended.  
Assume, for example, that a sex tourist is caught with a child prostitute 
in a remote resort in Thailand.  If he is not prosecuted, he might suffer some 
personal embarrassment and the opprobrium of the people who caught him.  
But the cost to his reputation at home--the reputation he cares most about--
will be low because there is no mechanism for people in the sex tourism 
destination country to affect his reputation at home.  A second type of cost is 
one that sex tourists certainly consider, and that is the monetary cost 
associated with avoiding prosecution.  This assumes that the entity that 
apprehended the suspect has the capacity to initiate legal proceedings (or 
credibly threaten to do so).  It is clear that sex tourists not only pay bribes, 
they exchange information about the amount they should pay.134
It is useful at this juncture to recall that the purpose of developing an 
economic model of deterrence is to identify the costs associated with 
unwanted activity.  The costs are those elements that make the activity less 
desirable, more difficult, or more risky.  Because the threat of apprehension 
and the threat of prosecution are different factors, and because both are 
substantial risks for those contemplating transnational crimes, they should 
be separately included in the deterrence model.
D.  The Substitution Process
Some models of deterrence account for substitution; that is, they account 
134See, e.g., Teacher Jailed for Kiddie Porn, supra note 26, at 34; 
Mark Baker, Cambodia a Haven for Australian Pedophiles, SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD, July 13, 2002, at 17.
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for the prospect that increasing the costs associated with committing one 
crime will decrease the incidence of that crime but provide an incentive to 
commit other crimes.  Most models of deterrence assume that individuals 
make a simple calculation:  if the benefits of committing a crime outweigh 
the costs, calculated as the probability of detection and the expected legal 
sanction, then a rational criminal will commit the crime.  Substitution 
models combine the simple deterrence calculation with the assumption that 
a criminal has the opportunity to commit more than one crime, and that the 
penalty for one crime has increased.  Thus, if the benefits of committing the 
second crime (reduced, of course, by the costs outlined above) outweigh the 
benefits of committing the first crime (reduced by a similar factor), then a 
rational criminal will commit the second crime.  An increase in the cost of 
committing the preferred crime (either an increase in enforcement or an 
increase in penalty, or a combination of both), can lead a criminal to 
substitute a second, less costly, crime for the first.  
In the deterrence literature that considers the substitution effect, 
substitution is treated as a simple, costless decision:135  if, for example, the 
cost of dealing crack increases (through higher penalties or more vigorous 
enforcement), then a drug dealer will simply sell heroin.  Even crimes that 
might not appear closely related--like rape, assault, prostitution, or murder--
are treated as potential substitutes for each other, under the right 
conditions.136  Treating substitution as an event rather than a process ignores 
the many potential costs contained in it, any one of which could be a point 
of regulation.
One important set of costs associated with the process of substitution are 
those incurred during the transition from one form of unwanted activity to 
another.  Again, most models of deterrence assume that substitution from 
one form of unwanted activity is costless.  While this might be an 
appropriate simplifying assumption with regard to closely linked offenses 
like dealing different kinds of drugs, it is out of place when discussing any 
kind of activity in which substitution is more complicated than that.  
Gathering information, particularly about transnational activity, can be 
very costly.  Recall that in the deterrence model, costs are those factors that 
make the activity less appealing, thereby reducing the net expected value of 
the benefit and making it less likely that a person will engage in the activity.  
Let us consider a common example from the deterrence literature, that of a 
135Some writers do include what are essentially sunk costs and the 
cost of raw materials as a cost of substitution.  See Katyal, supra note 46, at 
2397.
136Id. at 2393-95.
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drug dealer who learns that the penalty for dealing crack has increased.137
The conventional models predict that a dealer faced with this problem will 
survey the legal landscape, determine that the penalty for dealing heroin is 
less severe than that for dealing crack (and, to keep things simple, that the 
probability of detection is the same).  She will then begin to sell heroin.
The model's assumption is again at odds with human behavior.  Making 
the shift from selling one illegal drug to another is likely fraught with risks, 
some of which may be high enough to deter the shift (especially when 
combined with all the other costs).  Even in this simple example, the 
potential costs are clear enough.  First, like all retailers, drug dealers must 
identify suppliers for their goods.  It is safe to assume (especially with 
regard to illegal activity) that there is no ready list of potential suppliers.  
Second, drug dealers must identify new customers (even if we assume that 
drug dealers are indifferent to what they sell, there is ample evidence that 
drug users have strong preferences).  Finally, drug dealers, like all retailers, 
succeed or fail based in some part on their reputations.  All of this activity--
finding a supplier, identifying customers, establishing a brand--is likely to 
draw the attention of existing heroin dealers, with significant attendant risks.  
And a novice heroin dealer is more likely to be caught by law enforcement 
than an experienced crack dealer.      
E.  Investments and Sunk Costs
In economic terms, sunk costs are “costs that cannot be altered or 
avoided by current or future decisions.”138  These can include past 
investments in infrastructure (whether wise or unwise), consumer goods, 
real estate--virtually any past expenditure or investment that cannot be 
altered.  Because sunk costs cannot be altered, mainstream economics 
considers them irrelevant to decision making; a rational decision maker will 
ignore that which she cannot change.139  She may no longer think that her 
previous decision was wise, but she should not consider sunk costs in her 
future decisions.  There are two other ways to state the assumption that 
rational decision makers will ignore sunk costs.  One is to say that the 
amount we paid for a good is irrelevant to future decisions we make about it.  
The other is to say that, for the purpose of making future decisions, we 
should not care whether we received a good for free or if we paid for it; we 
137See id. at  2402-08.
138GRINOLS, supra note 45, at 241.
139Id.
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should treat both goods the same.  Consider an example.  Assume that two 
consumers obtain identical pairs of shoes.  One paid $200 for them and one 
got them for free.  Both find the shoes very uncomfortable to wear.  The 
rational choice model predicts that the consumer who paid $200 for the 
shoes will be as likely to give them away as the consumer who got them for 
free.  But our intuition tells us that the person who paid $200 is more likely 
to walk around in pain or even invest more money in stretching the shoes 
than the person who got them for free.140
It is by now widely accepted that this assumption does not accurately 
reflect actual decision making.141  Richard Thaler’s work on sunk costs has 
demonstrated that actual consumers do not behave as rationally as 
economists would predict.142  In one experiment, he advertised an all-you-
can-eat lunch at a local pizza restaurant.  He collected an admission price 
from every customer on the way in, then refunded the admission price to 
half the customers, selected at random.  Rational choice theory would 
predict that the amount of pizza consumed by those who paid would be the 
same (or nearly so) as the amount eaten by those who were enjoying a free 
lunch.  Reality was different.  Customers who received a refund ate less than 
those who had paid for their food.143  There is, of course, no way to know 
for certain why those who ate more did so.  One possibility is that those who 
paid felt a need to justify their investment.144  Another possibility is that 
those who ate less became less engaged in the process of eating because of 
the refund.  In either event, Thaler’s work shows that when making future 
decisions, those who have invested in a good tend, on average, to value it 
more highly than those who got the same good for free.
1. Investments in Expertise
Despite their general acceptance in the world of economics, Thaler’s 
insights have not made its way into the law-and-economics deterrence 
literature.  To see the importance of Thaler’s work to criminal deterrence, it 
140I take this example from FRANK, supra note 45, at 274.
141See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 38, at 1124-26.
142See., e.g., RICHARD THALER, QUASI-RATIONAL CHOICE (1991).
143Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 
J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 48 n.8 (1980).
144 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 38, at 1125.
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is first necessary to define the elements of criminal behavior that constitute 
an investment.  The decision to substitute one activity for another means 
abandoning substantial expertise and assuming the role of novice.  For most 
potential offenders, expertise is their most important investment.  Consider 
the crack/heroin example.  A successful crack dealer--that is, one who has 
not been run off by other dealers nor confined in prison--has accumulated a 
degree of expertise that allows him to avoid detection.  For example, he can 
likely tell an undercover officer from an actual customer or determine when 
a rival dealer's threats are bluffs and when they pose a real danger.  Potential 
sex tourists will have different expertise, but it is likely to be just as 
important to them as to anyone else.  Potential sex tourists need to know 
how to negotiate with procurers of prostitutes, how to negotiate bribes with 
law enforcement officials, and how to shield their proclivities from their 
friends and acquaintances.  
Potential offenders can obtain expertise in two main ways.  They can 
learn through experience, or they can learn from others engaged in the same 
activity.  Developing expertise through experience is costly.  For drug 
dealers, it might involve harassment or violence from rival dealers, 
unwanted attention from the police, time spent engaging in the low-paying 
and low-status aspects of the business, or time in prison.  For sex tourists, 
the costs are similar, and are likely to be higher for novices than repeat 
tourists.  They might involve incurring the costs associated with the 
uncertainty and fear of being caught by (and having to negotiate a bribe 
with) a foreign police officer, being ripped off by a tour guide or procurer, 
or ending up in a foreign jail.  
The tools of globalization--mainly the Internet, which offers anonymous, 
asynchronous communication--also offer offenders a way to obtain expertise 
at almost no cost.  For sex tourists, this means that they need not personally 
expose themselves to the risks associated with being a novice.  They can 
obtain the information they need to develop expertise from others who have 
gone before them.  Expertise developed in this way comes at a much lower 
price than expertise gained through bitter experience.145
Rational choice theory assumes that offenders are indifferent to the way 
that they gained expertise; because it is a sunk cost that cannot now be 
145See Kyung Hwan Baik & In-Gyu Kim, Optimal Punishment When 
Individuals May Learn Deviant Values, 21 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 271, 274 
n.6 (2001).  Baik and Kim limit their definition of illicit gains to feelings of 
satisfaction or thrill that an offender may derive from criminal activity.  Id. 
I use their framework, but expand their definition of illicit gains to include 
gains in expertise in accomplishing the activity.  
Keenan 43
altered, it should not influence future decision making.  The rational choice 
model would predict that when potential offenders consider what kind of 
offense to commit--sell crack or sell heroin, for example--they are 
indifferent to the amount of their investment in expertise.  They should only 
consider the utility they expect to gain from selling heroin versus that they 
would obtain selling crack, and the cost of each.  This assumption is 
embedded in the law-and-economics criminal deterrence literature on the 
substitution effect.  The substitution effect assumes that criminals freely 
switch between types of crimes, disregarding (as rational decision makers 
should) the investments they have made in gaining expertise.  
The work of Thaler and others tells us that this is not an accurate 
description of actual behavior.  The extent of investment in a particular good 
affects the decisions that people make about the good.  For example, Barry 
Staw has shown that people are more likely to invest in a losing activity 
when they have already invested in it.146  In other words, good money does 
follow bad, and the extent of the previous investment helps to determine 
how much good money will follow the bad money.  Thaler’s own work 
shows that people who obtain something for free are more likely to abandon 
it if it becomes associated with a higher cost in the future.  His pizza 
experiment is the most prominent example of this.147  One possible reason 
for this comes from a famous experiment by Elliot Aronson and Judson 
Mills.  They demonstrated that subjects who were forced to undergo a 
burdensome and unpleasant process as the price of admission to an activity 
tended to enjoy the activity more than those who had been admitted at a 
lower cost or for free.148
The importance of gaining expertise or entry into a particular criminal 
activity has important ramifications for understanding the deterrence of 
transnational crimes.  Typical approaches to deterrence, which contain most 
of the assumptions of the law-and-economics model, assume that if 
substitution occurs, it is a simple and costless transaction.  For the reasons 
developed above, I argue that this is not so.  By identifying the main points 
in the substitution process we can drive up the cost of the entire process and 
146See Barry M. Staw, Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy:  A Study of 
Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Alternative, 6 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 577 
(1981).  
147Thaler, supra note 143, at 48 n.8.
148See Elliot Aronson & Judson Mills, The Effects of Severity of 
Initiation on Liking for a Group, 59 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 177 
(1959).
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deter more people.  The next question is one to which this section is 
addressed:  among potential offenders, which are likely to seek a substitute 
and which are not likely to do so?  Because we know that for most people, 
sunk costs are relevant to decision making, we should expect that criminals 
who obtain their expertise for free would be more likely to seek substitutes 
than those who learn through experience.  We would predict that those with 
the smallest sunk costs would be the most likely to seek a substitute because 
they have the least to lose from abandoning their previous activity.149  Recall 
also that for deterrence, substitution is a good thing.  Everyone who 
substitutes a new activity for a preferred activity has, by definition, 
abandoned the first activity.  And some of those who abandon the first 
activity substitute to activities that are lawful or socially positive.  
Returning to the sex tourism example helps to illustrate the point.  There 
are actually two groups of people we want to deter.  The first group consists 
of those who engage in illicit sexual activity in the U.S. or Europe, have 
noticed that the costs associated with this activity are rising, and are 
considering whether to substitute sex tourism for their preferred activity.  
The second group are those who have already engaged in sex tourism and 
are considering whether to do it again.   Assume that both pools of people 
are divided into two groups, those who are willing to try their luck with little 
guidance, and those who seek information about the activity on the Internet.  
Deterrence policy should try to channel as many people into the second 
category as possible (and to intervene in the information exchange process
to dissuade people from engaging in sex tourism).  Because they have 
invested the least, these people are the most likely to be willing to abandon 
their investment and choose another activity for their substitute.  Another 
component of a strategy targeting those seeking to acquire expertise on the 
cheap should be to target tour companies and travel agencies that arrange 
sex tours.  Such companies provide expertise for a fee, and work with the 
tourists who are most likely to abandon the activity.  Another component of 
this strategy should be to focus on novices (regardless of how they seek to 
acquire expertise).  Because those with the smallest investments are the 
149It could also be that those who have invested more in developing 
the expertise necessary to “succeed” in their criminal activity are the most 
committed to it.  Those who invest the least in learning how to succeed at 
the activity may do so because they care the least about it.  It is therefore not 
surprising that those who have invested the least are the least likely to seek a 
substitute activity; by definition they are not as committed as the others.  For 
my purposes, it does not matter which explanation is the most likely.  In 
either case, the result is the same.
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most likely to abandon them, novices are likely to be the easiest to deter or 
detect.150
2. Sunk Costs and Norms
The idea of sunk costs is important in another way.  As developed more 
fully above, I argue that the conventional deterrence models leave out the 
costs associated with violating the internalized norms that are likely present 
in all people, even those who break the law.  Including the cost of 
overcoming norms might change the calculation in particular cases, and is 
important because it highlights the essential role of norms, but it does not 
change the structure of the model significantly.  The weakness of the model 
is that it assumes that substitution is a simple decision that can be made 
quickly and easily.  It assumes that substitution is costless when there is 
good reason to believe that the process is (or could be made) very costly.  
These models ignore an important insight from the norms literature.  
Although there are surely general norms encouraging or supporting law-
abiding behavior or good citizenship, norms are also individual and specific.  
So, for example, there are separate norms regarding the use or sale of crack 
versus the use or sale of heroin; separate norms against rape and against 
assault, and so on.151  It is a mistake to assume that once an individual has 
decided to commit one crime (thereby violating a particular norm) he would 
be equally willing to commit another crime (thus violating a separate norm).  
150Choosing this strategy does not mean abandoning the people in 
the first group--those willing acquire expertise through experience.  These 
people fit into the group discussed more fully above; they are novices, and 
must acquire important expertise at a time when they are most likely to be 
caught. 
151There is empirical support for this argument.  The University of 
Michigan's Monitoring the Future Study surveys students about their 
attitudes toward various drugs.  Not surprisingly, in 2003, as in all other 
years in the study, different drugs had different levels of disapproval.  For 
example, 53.4% of students disapproved of trying marijuana once or twice, 
86.6% disapproved of trying crack once or twice, and 94.1% disapproved of 
trying heroin once or twice.  Table 8-4:   Long-Term Trends in Disapproval 
of Drug Use by Twelfth Graders, in LLOYD D. JOHNSTON ET AL., U. MICH.
INST. SOC. RESEARCH, MONITORING THE FUTURE:  NATIONAL SURVEY 
RESULTS ON DRUG USE, 1975 – 2003, VOLUME 1, SECONDARY SCHOOL 
STUDENTS 2003, 338-39 (2004), available at 
http://monitoringthefuture.org/pubs/monographs/vol1_2003.pdf.
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As discussed above, violating an internalized norm is a cost that should be 
explicitly included in any deterrence model.  And each separate act involves 
the violation of a separate norm.  Thus, once a person has decided to violate 
an internalized norm against selling crack and actually begun to sell the 
drug, he has made a specific investment--paid a cost that might bring 
benefits, but that might not transfer to other enterprises--that is specific to 
crack dealing.  
Including this insight in the model makes substitution costlier:  once a 
criminal has incurred the sunk cost involved with selling crack, before he 
will begin to sell heroin, he must incur two costs.  First, he must abandon his 
investment in selling crack.  Abandoning this investment--which is, in my 
model, a violation of an internalized norm--will likely not be perceived as an 
exorbitant cost, but might be a cost nonetheless.  Second, he must be willing 
to incur the cost of selling heroin.  This cost could be negligible or very 
high, depending on the individual's personal attachment to the norms 
associated with the activity.  Because committing new criminal offenses 
likely involves incurring the cost of violating norms, substitution should be 
viewed as an important point at which the criminal enterprise must be "re-
capitalized."  As such it is an opportunity to turn away from the unwanted 
activity, not, as is often assumed, an automatic gateway into new and 
potentially more serious unwanted activity.  And because it is a moment of 
vulnerability for potential offenders, it is also an important juncture for 
policymakers to focus on.
IV.  STATUS AND INFLUENCE
As transnational activity has increased, one factor that has taken on 
greater importance in deterrence policy is status.  By this I mean the relative 
social status of the person who engages in unwanted activity, the social 
status of his victim, and the status accorded those who attempt to regulate 
the activity.  Among legal scholars, the issue of status is rarely given serious 
consideration.  When it is considered, it is typically in the context of 
attempting to explain the difference in sentences given to white collar 
criminals versus perpetrators of other crimes.152  There is a rich body of 
behavioral science literature on importance of status that has not yet been 
applied to transnational criminal activity.  
For transnational activity, status is relevant in at least three ways, all of 
152See, e.g., Stanton Wheeler et al., Sentencing the White-Collar 
Offender: Rhetoric and Reality, 47 AM. SOC. REV. 641 (1982); Paternoster 
& Simpson, supra note 65, at 549.
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which relate to the creation, maintenance, and vitality of norms.153  The first 
reason that status matters is that higher status can make norms much more 
difficult to enforce.154  Norms are enforced in a variety of ways, but all 
informal enforcement mechanisms--that is, those that do not rely directly on 
the intervention of law enforcement agents--work by affecting the offender’s 
reputation.  This can take the form of gossip about the offender that causes 
the community to reduce the esteem it accords her, criticism of the offender 
that has the same effect,155 or internal self-judgment that causes the offender 
to feel guilty or otherwise reduces the esteem she accords herself.156  This 
mechanism relies on the victims or observers of the norms violation being 
able to affect the offender’s esteem.  When the victim and the offender are 
not part of the same esteem “market,” either because the offender’s social 
status makes him immune to the criticism of his social lessers or because the 
offender is from another country and is literally absent from the locale after 
the activity takes place, the offender’s reputation is beyond the reach of the 
people affected by his behavior.  This leaves local observers with two 
choices:  they tolerate the behavior or they identify or develop other 
mechanisms to enforce the norms.  Either way, status affects the vitality and 
enforcement of norms. 
A second reason is that because the behavior of people with high status 
can come to symbolize their status, the actions of high-status people can 
inspire others to emulate them.  The symbols of status can include tangible 
indicia of wealth, like designer clothes or expensive cars, consumptive 
behaviors, like smoking different cigarettes or engaging in sex with 
prostitutes, or assertive behavior, like adopting a particular political or 
cultural attitude.  In this way the activities of foreign tourists can act as 
signals to poor people who wish to increase their status that those activities 
symbolize high status.  When the symbols of status are themselves illegal, 
153A couple of premises underlay my arguments.  The first is that 
Westerners typically have high status in the developing world.  The second 
is that status and wealth are not the same.  Differences in wealth can affect 
the market for bribes, as discussed elsewhere.  And individuals with more 
money than their peers might well be expected to have a higher social status, 
but this is not necessarily so.
154There are, of course, many other ways that a person can exempt 
himself from the local norms.  
155See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 113, at 362-65. 
156See Opp, supra note 67, at 409.
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the norms that regulated the unwanted activity are undermined.
The final reason that status matters is that it can distort the very process 
of judgment. There are two aspects to this argument.  First, behavioral 
science research has shown that the actions of those with high status are 
judged less harshly than the actions of those with lower status.  Put another 
way, actions that would be considered a violation of norms if engaged in by 
a person of low status are not judged to be a violation if engaged in by a 
person of high status.  The boundary for appropriate behavior is different for 
people with high status than for other people, which can also undermine the 
norms that regulate unwanted activity. The second component of the 
distortion argument relates to the way that observers judge the actions of 
people with whom they are not familiar.  When people observe others 
engaging in inappropriate behavior, they judge it harshly at first, then 
become less severe in their reactions.  This happens because the initial harsh 
judgment is based on two factors:  that the activity was unwanted or 
inappropriate, and that it was unexpected.  As the activity becomes routine, 
the expectations of observers are lowered, and they tolerate behavior that 
they would have earlier condemned. 
A.  Status Affects the Maintenance of Norms
Scholars disagree on the precise mechanism by which social norms are 
maintained, but there is broad agreement that disapproval is at the heart of 
the process.157  People might sanction those who violate norms by talking to 
others in the community about the violator, thereby reducing the social 
standing of the violator.158  People might sanction norms violations by 
confronting the violator directly and expressing that the observer now holds 
a lower opinion of the violator than before.159  People can sanction norms 
157See, e.g., Robert Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 
80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1095, 1096, 1105-06 (1986); William K. Jones, A 
Theory of Social Norms, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 545, 566-67 (1994); Philip 
Pettit, Virtus Normativa:  Rational Choice Perspectives, 100 ETHICS 725 
(1990); McAdams, supra note 113, at 372-75.  It is important to note that, 
although my discussion of the maintenance of norms focuses on sanctions, 
there are the other ways that norms can be maintained.  For example, norms 
might be maintained by declarations of the content of a norm or exhortations 
to follow the norm.
158See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 113, at 338. 
159See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 118.
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violations by refusing to cooperate with the violator in the future,160 even in 
the absence of gossip or a direct confrontation.  In addition to the sanctions 
imposed by others, norms can be maintained by internal sanctions.  A 
person who accepts the validity of a norm and nonetheless violates the norm 
might see his self-esteem erode.161  All of these mechanisms rely on the fact 
that the people want (or need for some functional reason) to feel that others 
approve of them and that they approve of themselves.  
Norms do not function everywhere; only where certain conditions are 
present do norms come into existence and continue to function.  Norms rely 
on information and connection to retain their vitality.  Members of the 
community must have information about the content of norms162 and the 
actions of others to set the size of a sanction and to properly target it.  There 
must also be strong connections among the individuals; those who follow 
norms must care enough about what others in the community think of them 
to modify their behavior.163  Caring about the opinions of others can take 
many forms.  It can mean a desire for approval, a desire to avoid 
disapproval, or a desire to be perceived as a reliable and worthwhile partner 
for business, social, or other exchanges.  
A complicating factor is the possibility that people who find the 
prevailing norms not to their liking will exit the “norm community.”164
When this happens, norms lose their power to regulate behavior.  It is just 
this situation that prevails when unwanted activity crosses borders and is 
facilitated by the processes of globalization.  Despite the claims of many 
that globalization has brought the world closer together, in many ways the 
opposite is true.  Largely because of the Internet, new communities abound.  
Traditional communities, because they were defined mostly by geography, 
included people of a variety of interests.  On the Internet, new communities 
include people who may share only one interest. To be sure, specialized 
communities are not new, but as a general matter, it is clear that the Internet 
160See generally POSNER, supra note 114.
161See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 113, at 338.
162See, e.g., id. at 358-60.
163See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 118, at 169 (predicting that 
norms will not evolve in a “transient social environment such as a singles 
bar at O’Hare Airport”).
164Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Rules, 96 COLUM. L. 
REV. 903, 919-20 (1996)
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has provided a forum for communities united only by a narrow interest.  
Such narrow communities are not necessarily bad--one can imagine 
communities devoted to backgammon or quilting--but they can also be 
havens for individuals whose preferences put them at odds with the 
geographic community in which they live or the larger society.
One of the benefits of a traditional community was that it typically 
subjected individuals within it to a range of influences and exposed people 
to a range of behaviors.  From this range of activity, individuals developed 
perceptions about what constituted appropriate or inappropriate behavior, 
the frequency of inappropriate or illegal behavior, and the sanction for such 
misbehavior.  In such a community, it is possible--indeed, in some cases 
likely--that the influence of the community would run counter to an 
individual's taste or desire on any particular issue.  It is, of course, possible 
to opt out of a community, but doing so will likely be costly (and force the 
individual to find another community).165
Internet communities166 do not include many contrary voices, in part 
because it is costless to opt out.  Social influence within Internet 
communities is likely to strongly reinforce, rather than challenge or channel, 
each individual member's existing tastes or predilections.167  In addition, 
virtual communities are self-reinforcing.  Returning to the sex tourism 
165See Barry Wellman & Keith Hampton, Living Networked On and 
Offline, 28  CONTEMP. SOC. 648, 652 (1999).  Wellman and Hampton write 
that living in “computer-supported networks differ[s] from living in 
traditional groups” because living in a virtual community “decreases the 
control that any one social milieu can have, while decreasing the 
commitment of any one milieu to a person’s well-being.”  Id.
166Virtual communities are those in which “members interact 
exclusively through the medium of computer technology.”  Steven Brint, 
Gemeinschaft Revisited:  A Critique and Reconstruction of the Community 
Concept, 19 SOC. THEORY 1, 11 (2001).  In such communities, there is a 
danger that interests will become dangerously narrow.  See generally Barry 
Wellman, et al., Computer Networks as Social Networks:  Collaborative 
Work, Telework, and Virtual Community, 22 ANN. REV. SOC. 213, 225 
(1996).  
167Healthy communities rely on dialogue and interaction to smooth 
out the rough moral edges of their members, and to arrive at a degree of 
consensus on what is considered appropriate behavior.  See, e.g., Amitai 
Etzioni, Creating Good Communities and Good Societies, 29 CONTEMP. 
SOC. 188, 191-192 (2000).  
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example will show the relevance of this point.  An Internet-based 
community, because it permits people to isolate themselves into self-
reinforcing groups defined by a single shared interest, can create an 
atmosphere in which members perceive that there is greater lawlessness than 
actually exists.  A community of sex tourists, or those interested in the 
activity, who interact regularly with other sex tourists, have effectively 
shrunk their range of influences to the point that they do not receive accurate 
information about the general level of lawlessness.  Like people who live in 
a community plagued by violence, they may come to believe that 
misbehavior is common and therefore appropriate.168  Similarly, they may 
also inaccurately perceive the likelihood of detection and sanction, which 
can further encourage unwanted activity.
The possibility that a person might exit a norms community does not 
depend on globalization, but the issue is much more complicated now.  Cass 
Sunstein cites a high school as an example of a situation in which 
individuals can freely exit and enter norms communities.169  He argues that 
students can leave a norms community that is not to their liking and form a 
new community with more congenial norms.170  This is possible, of course, 
but it is not easy, much less costless.  
First, students may be able to leave one community and form or join 
another, but doing so is not free when the communities are close to each 
other.  There may be many norms communities within a typical high school, 
but all students remain subject to the norms of the other communities 
because they cannot avoid interacting with each other.  When different 
norms communities form within the same geographic community, the 
different groups are stuck with each other; leaving one community and 
entering another might reduce the power of the first community’s norms, but 
it does not eliminate the pull that the norms will have.  Those who exit a 
community may face the disapproval of others in the first community; 
joining a new community may bring similar disapproval (it might also bring 
168This effect is likely to be even stronger in a virtual community 
than an actual community.  Many (perhaps most) people who find 
themselves stuck in violence-plagued localities likely retain anti-violence 
norms, and stay in the locality because of the costs of exit.  In other words, 
they suffer behavior that they disapprove of because they are stuck there.  In 
a virtual community, those who remain in the community likely either share 
or come to share the norms of the community because exit is free. 
169Sunstein, supra note 164, at 920.
170Id.
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approval).  But a student’s every move is apparent to the larger community 
and subjects her to the opinions of others, whether they are in her norms 
community or not.  
Second, students in the hypothetical high school have a variety of 
reputations; a student may be known as good at math, bad at soccer, or loyal 
in friendship.  These reputations may vary in importance to the student--she 
may care more about being known as a soccer star than a math whiz--but 
none of these reputations is irrelevant.  Because she cannot completely opt 
out of the larger community, her social standing and the quality of her life 
will depend at least in part on the amalgam of her reputations.  
Contrast this to the sex tourism example.  A tourist who travels from 
Chicago to Bangkok can completely (if temporarily) leave behind his old 
norms community.  His neighbors and acquaintances do not have the 
information necessary to express their approval or disapproval for his 
actions, leaving them without the power to affect his reputation or otherwise 
sanction him.  Even if he has opted out of a norms community in his 
hometown--imagine, for example, that he left the church to which he used to 
belong and no longer cares what its members think of him--he is still 
vulnerable to its disapproval because the members of his old community 
have the power to influence the members of his new community.  When the 
different norms communities exist in the same geographic space, even 
leaving one community does not make him immune to its influence.  The 
people with whom he interacts in Bangkok will have more information 
about him, but will be less able to affect his reputation.  As with the high 
school student, the quality of the tourist’s social life will depend, at least in 
part, on his reputation.  But because he lives most of his life in one place but 
seeks pleasure in another, he can segment his reputations and avoid the 
sanctions that would otherwise be his due.
As discussed above, when an action violates established norms, there are 
several possible ways that a community might react in order to maintain the 
vitality of norms and punish the transgressor.  One typical initial response is 
to try to “ignore or normalize the violation.”171  Observers try to find ways 
to reconceptualize the violation as normal activity, or simply do not react.  If 
this fails, then observers might modify their perceived relationship with the 
transgressor, assigning him the role of “norm violator” and taking on the 
role of “norm carrier.”172  When the norm carrier confronts the norm 
violator, a typical reaction might be to contest the allegation, provide an 
171See Murray Webster, Jr. & Stuart J. Hysom, Creating Status 
Characteristics, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 351, 366 (1998).
172Id. 
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excuse for the behavior, or apologize.173
The process of negotiating an account for the transgressive behavior is 
vital to maintenance of norms.174  Transgressors who show remorse and 
offer an account of their actions “reestablish themselves as a proper person,” 
and thereby transform the “infraction into an acceptable act that could be 
ignored.”175  Even if the transgressor does not show remorse, that he is 
confronted with the violation and responds in some way is essential.  Doing 
so helps to maintain the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable 
behavior, and thereby maintain the vitality of norms.  But when the norm 
violator is a person of high status, he can exempt himself from the norms 
market of the norms carrier.  He is never confronted with his misbehavior 
and the community never has an opportunity to re-affirm its commitment to 
the norm.  As I argue in the next part, when the allure of high status is 
combined with an interruption in the process of policing norms, the 
boundary between acceptable and unacceptable behavior can become blurry 
indeed.
B.  Prominence, Influence, and Unwanted Activity
Almost anything can come to represent high status.176  Some attributes 
or behaviors become status symbols because of their operational utility.  For 
example, the owner of a cell phone in a place where land telephone lines are 
unreliable may see her status rise because she can provide a service that is 
otherwise not available.177  But other attributes become status symbols for 
173Id.
174See, e.g., Etzioni, supra note 167, at 188.  Central to Etzioni’s 
conception of a healthy community is the idea of “moral dialogue.”  Id. at 
192.  For him this means a process by which “people engage in 
deliberations” about what constitutes appropriate activity and values.  Id.  A 
healthy society must address and wrestle with conflicting attitudes and 
behavior to arrive at a set of norms that represents the moral sense of the 
community.  
175Sheldon Ungar, The Effects of Status and Excuse on Interpersonal 
Reactions to Deviant Behavior, 44 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 260, 263 (1981).
176See, e.g., Webster, Jr. & Hysom, supra note 171, at 352.
177See generally Kasra Naji, Dhaka Rings Rural Poor’s Number, 
FIN. TIMES, September 18, 1996, at 4.
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more abstract reasons.  Characteristics that are unrelated to survival can 
become popular because they are associated with high status.  “A person 
with status sets the standards and norms by which others will act, and in this 
way embodies the goals of a culture.”178 By engaging in behavior 
associated with high status, the actor signals to observers that he is of the 
same standing as others who engage in the same behavior.179  Because the 
actions of those with high status can be seen as symbols of their status, 
observers might emulate or adopt the activity in an attempt to cultivate for 
themselves higher status.180
A good illustration comes from the Democratic Republic of Congo.181
The DRC is a country of many languages.  Swahili is the most common 
language spoke in Bukavu, a city in Eastern Congo, though a handful of 
local languages are also spoken.  Beginning in the 1990s, Lingala, a 
language mostly spoken along trade routes and in the capital Kinshasa, 
began to emerge as a popular language in Bukavu, which is more than 1000 
miles away from Kinshasa.182  There was no linguistic reason for Lingala to 
spread to Bukavu because the population’s linguistic needs were already 
satisfied by indigenous languages.183  But Lingala did gain a foothold, and 
the reason was status.  Because it was the language of the capital--a city 
viewed by those in the interior to be sophisticated and glamorous--Lingala 
178See, e.g., MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & EUGENE ROCHBERG-
HALTON, THE MEANING OF THINGS:  DOMESTIC SYMBOLS AND THE SELF 29 
(1981).  
179Id.  
180See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE 
L.J. 1, 38 (1992) ("those who enjoy high status have an interest in 
symbolizing their status, while those who lack status seek to appropriate 
such symbols and construct a 'fraudulent' status for themselves") citing 
GRANT MCCRACKEN, CULTURE AND CONSUMPTION:  NEW APPROACHES TO 
THE SYMBOLIC CHARACTER OF CONSUMER GOODS AND ACTIVITIES 33 
(1988).
181Didier L. Goyvaerts, The Emergence of Lingala in Bukavu, Zaire, 
33 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 299 (1995).
182Id. at 307.
183Id. at 308.
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symbolized prestige and high status.184  The desire to emulate the behavior 
of those with high status prompted many people in Bukavu to learn a 
language that would be of no operational utility to them.  This small 
example demonstrates a couple of important points.  The first is that almost 
anything can be a status characteristic.185  The second is that status is a 
powerful motivator.  People are willing to expend resources to develop a 
skill with little functional utility just to increase their status.
Finally, the example shows the complicated relationship of status to 
behavior and characteristics.  The possession of characteristics associated 
with a particular status creates expectations about the behavior of the 
individual who has the characteristics.  For example, male and white 
employees may be assumed to be more competent at job-related tasks than 
are women and non-whites.186  But just as status shapes expectations about 
behavior, behavior can affect status.  People who demonstrate competence 
can overcome the expectations associated with their initially low status.187
This process is complicated, but the point I draw is limited:  a person who 
adopts behaviors associated with high status can thereby enhance her status.  
A separate but closely related concern has to do with the role of social 
influence. Individuals decide to engage in unwanted activity based on a 
number of factors, as discussed above.  Among these factors is the 
individual’s perception that the activity is common or rare.  Scholars have 
suggested, most famously in the “Broken Windows” literature,188 that 
people who regularly live with indicia of disorder--such as broken windows, 
graffiti, or litter--are more likely to commit crimes than those who do not 
live with such disorder.  "[I]ndividuals are much more likely to commit 
crimes when they perceive that criminal activity is widespread,"189 than if 
184Id.
185See, e.g., Georg Simmel, Fashion, 10 INT’L Q. 130 (1904), 
reprinted in 62 AM. J. SOC. 541 (1957).
186See Webster, Jr. & Hysom, supra note 171, at 373.
187Id.
188See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, THE 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29.  
189Kahan, supra note 119, at 350.
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they perceive it to be rare.  Proponents of  "social influence"190 suggest that 
there are several reasons it plays a role in the decision to commit a crime:  
"the individual rationality of conforming to behavior of other individuals, ... 
the reputational benefits of conforming to social norms, and ... a deep-seated 
affinity between individuals that causes them to value conformity for its 
own sake."191  This position is controversial, and scholars disagree about 
what constitutes social influence and the extent to which it actually affects 
behavior.192  Scholars such as Dan Kahan argue that people are motivated to 
commit crimes when they see indicia of disorder.  They do not argue that it 
is necessary to actually see others committing similar crimes.193  For 
example, people who live in neighborhoods marred by graffiti or litter are 
more likely to commit robberies than people who live in cleaner 
neighborhoods.  
My argument is different in an important way.  I argue that social 
influence is indeed a powerful force, but that its power is limited to similar 
behavior.  In other words, people are not motivated to commit robberies by 
seeing a lot of litter or graffiti; they are motivated to commit robberies only 
if they see (or are aware of) a great number of robberies.  Social influence 
operates only when activity is observed.  The more individuals know about 
the actions of others, and the more often they interact with others, the 
greater role played by social influence in determining individual choices.  
One cannot be influenced by that which one does not perceive; and, all 
things being equal, repeated events are more likely to be influential than 
single events.  Thus, my modified social influence argument suggests that if 
190Id.
191Id. at 356 (citing JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL 
THEORY 197-240 (1990); TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES 24-
37 (1995); Sunstein, supra note 164, at 916-17; and STEPHEN R.G. JONES, 
THE ECONOMICS OF CONFORMISM (1984)).
192Bernard Harcourt, among others, has attacked the Broken 
Windows theory, arguing that the evidence to support the theory is 
unconvincing.  Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject:  A Critique 
of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows 
Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 
291 (1998).  Although Harcourt’s account is more convincing, I use social 
influence in a slightly different way than its usual advocates and avoid the 
problems that he highlights.
193See Kahan, supra note 119, at 355-61.
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observers notice an increase in the kinds of illicit sexual behavior associated 
with sex tourism, then local people would be influenced to engage in similar 
activity.194
Understanding the power of status shows the importance of this 
argument to the deterrence of transnational crimes.  Members of a 
community witness the behavior of countless people every day.  But not all 
behavior is equally influential.  The actions of some members of the 
community are more likely to affect the behavior of observers than are the 
actions of other members.  Some norms scholars have recognized this fact, 
but their conception of the phenomenon omits an important consideration.  
Robert Ellickson has put forth the most convincing description of the 
emergence of norms.195  He argues that a social norm “is not the product of 
‘diffuse social forces.’”  Instead, norms result from the “purposive actions of 
discrete individuals, especially those who are particularly suited to 
providing the new rule and those who are particularly eager to have it 
adopted.”196  Under this view, new norms are created by those who expect to 
benefit from the new way of doing things.197  Ellickson names “self-
motivated leaders,”198 “norm entrepreneurs,”199 and “opinion leaders”200 as 
194There is evidence that this phenomenon can occur with other, less 
complicated crimes.  For example, there is good evidence that if the police 
crack down on drug use in one neighborhood, they can drive drug deals to a 
nearby neighborhood.  One of the harms that flows from this displacement is 
that it can “normalize[]” a dangerous and illegal activity among a 
“previously un-exposed” population.  Wood, et al., supra note 91, at 1155.  
Displacement might thus create crime if it introduces an illegal activity into 
a population that had been previously free or nearly free of the activity.
195Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & 
ECON. REV. 1 (2001).
196Id. at 2.
197Id. at 10-16.
198Id. at 13-15.
199Id. at 15.
200Id. at 16-17.
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examples of “change agents”201--those who supply new norms.  Although he 
describes important differences between types, each is thought to act 
intentionally.  Ellickson argues that those who supply new norms do so 
because they expect to benefit from the new rule, and are therefore willing 
to pay a price (or forego current benefits for future gains) because of the 
payoffs the new norm will bring them.  
By considering only purposive action, this conception of the creation of 
norms ignores the important role of status. Ellickson’s description of the 
role of “change agents” incorporates much of the social science literature on 
opinion leaders.202  They are the people whom others follow.  Those who 
study marketing spend a lot of time trying to identify the characteristics of 
opinion leaders.203  They have identified at least one essential trait:  public 
individuation.204  This means the extent to which “people feel differentiated, 
to some degree, from other people and choose to act differently from 
them.”205  Importantly, public individuation is not necessarily purposive.  It 
“involves behaviors that get attention, regardless of the underlying 
motive.”206  It is here that status become relevant.  Those with high status--
particularly outsiders--are socially prominent; their behavior is observed 
more closely than that of other people.  Like it or not, they are “publicly 
individuated,” and they act as opinion leaders.  They do not necessarily 
create new norms purposefully, but because of their status and prominence, 
their behavior is influential.
Recent behavioral science research highlights a final factor that can 
undermine the power of norms to regulate behavior.  Economists have long 
201Id. at 10.
202Those whom Ellickson calls “change agents” (of whom “opinion 
leaders” are a subset) are sometimes described generally as “opinion 
leaders” in social science literature.  I use the term “opinion leader” in the 
more general sense.
203See, e.g., Becky Ebenkamp, Under the Influence:  Insights into 
What Consumers are Thinking, How They’re Acting and Why, 45 
BRANDWEEK 18 (2004); Kenny K. Chen & Shekhar Misra, Characteristics 
of an Opinion Leader:  A New Dimension, 19 J. ADVERTISING 53 (1990).
204Chen & Misra, supra note 203, at 53.
205Id. at 54.
206Id.
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recognized that relative income and relative status can be powerful 
determinants of well-being.207  People care not just about their absolute level 
of wealth or status, but also about how they measure up against others.  But 
economists have only recently recognized that the “others” against whom 
people measure themselves--their reference standards--are at least in part 
consciously chosen.208  People are thought to choose reference standards to 
fulfill two goals:  “self-enhancement” and “self-improvement.”209  Self-
enhancement is a downward comparison; people seek to feel better by 
comparing themselves to those who are less competent or have less money 
or a lower status.210  Self-improvement is an upward comparison; people 
compare themselves to those who are more competent in order to improve 
their own performance.211  Globalization broadens the opportunity to 
“choose the Joneses” against whom one wishes to compare social standing.  
C.  Status Distorts the Process of Judgment and Disapproval
The reaction of observers to unwanted activity depends not just on the 
act, but also on the status, characteristics, and history of the person engaging 
207See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND:  
HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS (1985); A.E. Clark & A.J. 
Oswald, Satisfaction and Comparison Income, 61 J. PUB. ECON. 359 (1996); 
Markus Knell, Social Comparison, Inequality, and Growth, 112 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECON. 664 (1999); McAdams, supra note 
180, at 1.
208Armin Falk & Markus Knell, Choosing the Joneses:  Endogenous 
Goals and Reference Standards, 106 Scandinavian J. Econ. 417 (2004).  
209Id. at 418, citing Joanne V. Wood & Kathryn L. Taylor, Serving 
Self-Relevant Goals Through Social Comparison, in SOCIAL COMPARISON:  
CONTEMPORARY THEORY AND RESEARCH 23-49 (Jerry Suls & Thomas A. 
Wills, eds.,1991).
210Id. at 417.
211Id. at 418.  The two comparisons are not as contradictory as they 
first appear.  People compare themselves downward to make themselves feel 
better in the short term.  People compare themselves upward to improve 
their performance, which increase their utility in the long term.  Thus both 
comparisons eventually have the same effect.  Id.
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in the activity.212  For example, there is empirical evidence that people of 
high status are treated less harshly than people of low status for violations of 
the law.  High-status offenders might expect to receive less severe 
punishment than low-status offenders for the same behavior.  But the affect 
of status appears to go beyond differential reactions to acknowledged 
violations of the law (or norms).  Status appears to distort the very process 
of judging.  Observers are less likely to conclude that a given act is deviant 
when it is engaged in by a person of high status rather than a person of low 
status.213  An act that is unacceptable when committed by a person with low 
status can be acceptable when committed by a person with high status.  Not 
surprisingly, this effect is greater for acts that are normatively 
questionable.214  Indeed, some behavioral science evidence suggests that 
high status persons are judged less harshly for minor transgressions but 
more harshly for major transgressions than people with low status.215
There are several possible reasons for the distorting effect of high status.  
First, high status is often bestowed upon people who make positive 
contributions to the community.  Regardless of whether the contributions are 
economic, social, or cultural, those who contribute most to the community 
can receive greater rewards--or less disapproval--than those who contribute 
less.216  Related to this is the fear that a person who makes a 
disproportionate contribution to the community will withdraw his 
212See Sheldon Ungar, The Effects of Status and Excuse on 
Interpersonal Reactions to Deviant Behavior, 44 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 260 
(1981).
213See Bonnie H. Erickson & T.A. Nosanchuk, The Allocation of 
Esteem and Disesteem:  A Test of Goode’s Theory, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 648, 
658 (1984).  Erickson and Nosanchuk found that deviance has a weaker 
effect on people of high status because “the interpretation of an act as 
deviant is more problematic for high status people.”  Id.
214See Calvin Morrill, et al., It’s Not What You Do, But Who You 
Are:  Informal Social Control, Social Status, and Normative Seriousness in 
Organizations, 12 SOC. FORUM 519, 532-33 (1997).  
215See James A. Wiggins, et al., On Status-Liability, 28 SOCIOMETRY 
197, 206 (1965).  
216Id. at 206.  
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contribution if he is judged harshly for his deviant behavior.217  The sex 
tourism example provides some evidence to support this point.  The money 
foreign tourists spend thought to contribute significantly to the local 
economy, and their behavior is seen as the price of their contribution to the 
local economy.
Another possible explanation for the effect status has on judgment is the 
risk of retaliation more generally.  In addition to fearing that a high-status 
person will withhold his contributions, observers might also fear that the 
high-status person might retaliate in other ways.218  This fear recognizes that 
people with high status often have greater social power and greater ability to 
influence legal authorities.  
The second aspect of the distortion argument relates to the interaction 
between observers’ expectations and their reactions to behavior.  There are 
several ways that expectations shape reactions.  First, observers are less 
likely to disapprove of the actions of a person for whom they already have 
low expectations than they are when they see a stranger (or someone for 
whom they have high expectations) engage in the same behavior.219
“Unexpected unpleasant behavior produces greater annoyance and 
disappointment than the same behavior would if expected.”220  Indeed, the 
greater the distance between the observer’s expectations and the observed 
behavior, the more likely it is that observers will condemn the behavior.221
Second, observers are more likely to sanction a transgressor if they believe 
217Id. at 207.
218Id.
219This argument does not, of course, include just those with high 
status.  Its focus is more closely linked to familiarity than to status.  It is 
relevant here for two main reasons.  First, most sex tourists are foreign, and 
thus strangers (at least initially) in the area in which they engage in 
unwanted activity.  Second, for the reasons outlined above, high status 
seems to complicate the process of judgment, which would exacerbate the 
problem that my argument identifies.  Thus my argument includes more 
than just people with high status, but it is most salient for those people.
220Ralph Wahrmann, High Status, Deviance and Sanctions, 33 
SOCIOMETRY 485, 486 (1970).
221Peggy G. Giordano, Sanctioning the High-Status Deviant:  An 
Attributional Analysis, 46 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 329, 337 (1983). 
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that he knew that his actions were causing harm.222  Observers thus impute 
knowledge to the transgressor and judge his actions based in part on the 
imputed knowledge.  Finally, observers are more likely to draw a negative 
conclusion about a transgressor if they conclude that his high status 
facilitated the deviant act.223
The sex tourism example shows the importance of these arguments in 
two spheres--reaction to the action, and reaction to the actor.  Because the 
actions of people with high status can come to symbolize high status and 
prompt others to emulate them, their actions can change the attitudes of 
local people about the activity.  If people with high status continue to 
engage in behavior that was formerly considered deviant, the act can lose its 
deviant status.  This can have several consequences.  One is that local 
people might become more likely to engage in it.  The deviant acts of 
Westerners can thus increase the overall amount of deviant activity.  A 
second consequence is that as local people lose their disapproval for an 
activity, they are less likely to report transgressions to law enforcement, 
which reduces the cost of the activity for the actor.
Transnational activity, especially activity that is normatively 
problematic, involves the creation of an identity.  Local people with limited 
experience with Westerners do not have firm expectations about how they 
will behave.  But as there is more contact, expectations form.  It is essential 
to deterrence policy that expectations form in a way that produces healthy 
norms.  If local people come to expect Westerners to engage in illicit sexual 
activity, it is much less likely that those engaging in the behavior will pay 
any social cost for their transgression.  As the cost of engaging in the 
activity goes down, the incidence of the activity is likely to go up.  But if 
local people come to believe that Westerners are able to engage in illicit 
sexual activity because of their high status, or that Westerners know that 
they are causing harm when they engage in the activity, it is more likely that 
local people will disapprove of the behavior and impose some sort of 
sanction.  
V.  CONCLUSION
Globalization has changed the reality of criminal opportunities and 
behavior, but theory has not kept up.  This Article has been the first attempt 
to think through these changes and what they should mean for deterrence 
theory.  Building on the theoretical insights developed above, I take a first 
222Id. at 334.  
223Id. at 335. 
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step toward recommending changes in policy.  
By drawing on the rigorous models of law-and-economics and the rich 
detail of criminology literature, I have attempted to arrive at a more helpful 
approach.  For deterrence policy, the goal of developing any model of 
behavior is to identify points of intervention--those factors that reduce the 
appeal of criminal behavior or increase the appeal of legitimate activity.  
Identifying these points of intervention is essential policy because it is at 
these points that we can target policy initiatives.  In economic terms, the 
goal is to increase the cost of criminal activity; criminology helps us identify 
the costs. 
I have identified several factors that we must consider in assessing the 
costs of an effective deterrence policy.  The first are the informal costs of 
apprehension.  These can take the form of social disapprobation, feelings of 
guilt, or loss of social position.  Regardless of their form, the risk of 
suffering such a sanction can operate as a cost, reducing the attractiveness of 
unwanted behavior.  The next set of costs are those associated with the 
substitution process.  This process is complicated and fraught with risks for 
potential offenders, making it a potentially powerful target of regulation.  
Within the substitution process, there are several important elements to 
consider.  One is where potential offenders obtain the expertise that will 
allow them to move into the new area of activity.  This information can 
come from personal experience or it can come from the experience of 
others.  Another key element is the question of norms.  It is important to 
recognize that different activities are subject to different norms, and that 
people who are willing to commit one kind of crime may not be willing to 
commit another.  
Finally, we must consider the critical role that status can play in 
transnational crime.  Status is important in several ways.  It is more difficult 
to enforce social norms against people who are able to exempt themselves 
from the relevant norms community, either because their status makes them 
immune from the opprobrium of those whom they have offended or because 
they can simply leave the area.  Status is also important because the actions
of people of high status can come to symbolize their status.  Attitudes, 
tangible goods, and personal activities can all come to represent high status, 
and can inspire others to seek or emulate the status symbols.  Finally, status 
matters because it can distort the process of judgment.  The activities of 
those with high status are often judges less severely than the activities of 
those with lower status.  
What does this mean for policy?  This is, of course, a complicated 
question whose answer will vary for each country and each kind of activity.  
The first answer is simply to expand the list of policy responses.  Globalized 
activity is not as simple as local crime, and the responses cannot be as 
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simple.  This means shifting the focus from tinkering with the length of a 
prison sentence to considering thornier issues, like disrupting the flow of 
information between sex tourists.  That sex tourists are able to obtain 
expertise for free reduces their costs and makes the activity more attractive.  
Law enforcement officials should increase the cost of gathering information 
by shutting down news groups or Usenet sites, for example.224  Another way 
to attack the flow of information is to target organized tour companies.225
Those who work as intermediaries facilitate the industry, and targeting them 
could reduce the attractiveness of such travel to sex tourists. 
Another set of responses centers around status and norms.  Again, 
information is critical.  The desire to maintain a positive reputation is an 
important motivation for many people to comply with norms.  Sex tourists 
are able to segment their reputations and avoid the disapprobation they 
would otherwise deserve because the people who witness their illicit activity 
are not able to communicate with the home geographic community of 
Western tourists.  This reduces the cost to the tourist and makes the activity 
more appealing.  One way to give local people access to a sex tourist’s 
reputation is to provide for some kind of shaming penalty.  For example, if a 
person is arrested in a sex tourism destination country, law enforcement 
officials might publicize the arrest in the suspect’s home town in the West.  
Such shaming penalties are not uncomplicated, of course, but might provide 
a way to prevent potential offenders from segmenting their reputations.  A 
related response would be to publicize the issue of sex tourism in destination 
countries.  Examining the role of status highlights the importance of 
bystanders in the maintenance of norms.  Without the active participation of 
bystanders, norms against illicit sexual activity cannot be maintained.  And, 
as we have see, the role of status complicates the participation of local 
bystanders.  If law enforcement officials publicly endorsed the norms 
against such activity, local bystanders would be empowered and would be 
more likely to notice and act against such activity. 
224For example, law enforcement officials can visit chat rooms 
anonymously to monitor the discussions on sex-related web sites.  See 
Robert Worth, Jeanine Pirro’s Sting: Visiting Chat Rooms to Chase 
Pedophiles, THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 15, 2001, at sect. 14, p.1.  Law 
enforcement officials might also create fake web sites that lure potential sex 
tourists to sites at which they received warnings about their activity.  See Jill 
Lawless, Nations to Search Internet for Pedophiles, www.bizreport.com,
June 9, 2004.
225Hawaii, for example, has made it a crime to sell travel services to 
promote prostitution.  See HAW. REV. STAT. § 712-1208 (2005).  
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Finally, and perhaps most critically, it is possible to modify the 
substantive criminal law to make it more responsive to the potential for 
displacement.  One good example of such a change is the increase in what 
are essentially long-arm statutes.  These statutes allow a source country to 
punish a citizen for his actions outside the country.226  Some source 
countries go further and restrict the travel of convicted sex offenders.227  All 
of these measures are ways for a source country to account for the true costs 
of its regulations and help to prevent the spread of unwanted activity.  These 
sorts of measures require us to do the important work of thinking about 
crime and crime prevention globally, with an eye toward truly reducing it, 
rather than shifting it to countries less capable of combating it.
226See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423 (2003) (making it illegal to engage 
in illicit sexual conduct outside the U.S. and criminalizing the facilitation of 
sex tourism by travel operators); Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c.42, s.72 
(permitting prosecution of acts done outside the U.K. that would have been 
illegal if committed in the U.K.); see also Nick Madigan, Man, 86, 
Convicted Under New Law Against Americans Who Go Abroad to Molest 
Minors, NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 19, 2004, at A12; Sara K. Andrews, 
Comment, U.S. Domestic Prosecution of The American International Sex 
Tourist:  Efforts to Protect Children from Sexual Exploitation, 94 J. CRIM. L 
& CRIMINOLOGY 415 (2004).
227Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c.42, s.86 & SI 1220/5-8 (requiring 
sex offenders to give notice to the Secretary of State before leaving the 
U.K.). 
